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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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17 January 1984

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BACKGROUND TO BOKASSA'S FAILED RETURN EXPLAINED

Personalities Involved

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English Vol 24 No 24, Nov 83 pp 2-4

[Text] The regime of President Andre Kolingba could fall at any time. A group of businessmen, political opportunists and mercenaries are waiting in France and Bagon for things to fall apart in the CAR capital, Bangui.

Kolingba is faced with a deepening economic crisis, growing dissension within the ruling Comite Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN) and a new-found unity among the hitherto diverse opposition. He dared not leave the country for the Franco-African summit at Vittel last month.

With the regime struggling for survival, the political atmosphere in Bangui is hysterical: alleged coup plots abound. Recently, for example, a Commander Miro and a number of cabinet members were arrested on charges of being involved in a plot. About 60 alleged co-conspirators have been detained and are now languishing in the Karai military camp near Bangui.

To add to the uncertainty, the former "Emperor" of CAR, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, has been persuaded to try to return to CAR. Last week he attempted to leave Abidjan, where he has lived in exile since 1979, for Bangui.

Bokassa Stars in French Comedy

The plan to reinstall him to the presidency was master-minded by a certain Roger Delpey, who achieved notoriety when he was imprisoned in 1980 by Giscard d'Estaing for possession of compromising documents on Franco-CAR relations. With Delpey at Bokassa's side in Abidjan, a leased Caravelle jet with Arabic inscriptions was flown to Le Bourget airport outside Paris, now used only for special occasions. Meanwhile a group of 20 people had gathered at 4.00 a.m. in a Paris hotel waiting for word that "Operation Bokassa" had the go-ahead.

The group included Delpey (armed with Bokassa's imperial uniforms), a number of selected journalists, several mercenaries and some special advisers to the government (including Gouffre de la Pradelle and Vladimir Tcheremissinoff, who goes by the sobriquet of Arapoff). Agents of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the French counter-intelligence agency, watched the proceedings with interest, and even allowed the group to take off.

After a refuelling stop at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria the Caravelle proceeded to Abidjan. Bokassa, who by this time was lurking with a small posse close to Abidjan airport, was to have slipped through airport security and immediately boarded the plane. Three hours later they would have been in Libreville (Gabon), the staging post for a "triumphant" return to Bangui the following day.

Officially the Caravelle had flight clearance from Libreville to N'Djamena in Chad. After about 30 minutes of flight Bangui airport control was to be asked for permission to make an emergency landing there; Bokassa was to be met by agents previously infiltrated into Bangui; a light aircraft was to shower Bangui with leaflets announcing Bokassa's return; and president Kilongba was supposed to have disappeared in the consequent political whirlpool.

Guy Penne, the Elysee's special adviser on African affairs, informed of the plan, called Ivorian president Houphoet-Boigny from Niger. Houphouet-Boigny ordered the airport army garrison to prevent the plane taking off with Bokassa and to bring him under armed guard to the presidential residence. The plane was then ordered to leave. And Bokassa was told that he would never be allowed to leave the Ivory Coast.

Bokassa is being manipulated by a number of individuals for financial and political reasons. An unstable individual prone to drink, he wants to vindicate his brutal dictatorship by writing his memoirs. He is now being pushed to regain the CAR presidency but this time only as a figurehead. He would live in his home village of Berengo, leaving Bangui politics to his manipulators and their associates.

But there is another angle. Delpey, who is involved with opposition politics in France, also maintains open contact with President Mitterrand's security advisers Roland Dumas and Francois de Grossouvre. In this unexpected modus vivendi a tactical entente may have been found between the Gaullist opposition behind Jacques Chirac and the socialists. Such an accord would have the purpose of keeping Bokassa as a potential Damocles sword over Giscard d'Estaing's head in order to disrupt his plans for a political comeback. Other moves in this direction include the recent purchase by France's first television channel, TF1, of a documentary on Bokassa, which includes an interview with him that is likely to be embarrassing for Giscard d'Estaing. Pierre Salinger has recently completed for ABC television a three-hour documentary on Operation Barracuda, the French military operation which toppled Bokassa in 1979.

Competing with Delpey for influence over Bokassa is ex-parachutist Jean-Pierre Dupont, whose notoriety arose from the fact that he organised Bokassa's mock Napoleonic coronation as "Emperor." His influence, however, is on the wane. Former "Crown Prince" Georges Bokassa is also seeking to capitalise on his father's name in Paris business circles.

Four large international companies, one of them based in the US, came to a provisional agreement with Bokassa on the assumption that he would regain the presidency. In return for their largesse, (about \$1m?) the companies would receive concessions in uranium, diamonds, oil, ivory and other commodities. The plan has fallen flat, but Bokassa now has three cars, a range of video equipment (used for sending tapes back to CAR, to pave the way for his once expected return), and three workshops (knitting, fashion and woodwork) in the ground floor of his well-appointed villa in the Adjame quarter of Abidjan.

Exit Kolingba, Enter Who?

The dilemma facing Paris is how to install a credible and broader-based regime in Bangui. Paris' favourite candidate for a coalition government is Dr Abel Koumba, one of the rare CAR politicians with a reputation for integrity. Leader of the radical nationalist Front Patriotique Oubankien-Parti du Travail (FPO-PT), he lived in exile for 17 years before returning to Bangui in 1982, only again to be thrown into prison. He was recently released under strong French pressure. His party is unique for being non-tribally based, culling its militants and wider support from the ranks of teachers, students and civil servants in the capital and other urban centres. The FPO-PT reportedly joined recently an umbrella organisation with other opposition forces in view of presenting a united front and a credible alternative to Kolingba's regime. Other groups in the umbrella organisation include the Mouvement de Liberation du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC) and the Mouvement Centrafricain de Liberation National National (MCLN). The MLPC improved its image earlier this year when the discredited politician Ange Patasse, now living in exile in Togo, was cast out of the leadership. At the head of its new nine-member political directorate is secretary-general Francis-Albert Ouakanga and his deputy Jacques Boniba. The MCLN has sought to move more to the ideological left by claiming the "democratic socialist" tag. Responsible for a bomb attack in a Bangui cinema two years back, the MCLN is ostensibly led by Gen Francois Bozize and Gen M'Baikoua, both involved in last year's aborted coup (AC Vol 23 No 7).

Destabilisation of CAR, where France has 1,200 paratroopers and Jaguar strike aircraft at Bouar, would increase the logistical problems of France's military presence in neighbouring Chad. It would also enable partisans of Goukouni Waddeye's GUNT forces to use CAR border areas as a base for operations against President Hissene Habre's forces in southern Chad. Above all, many French Africanists are worried that a power vacuum in Bangui would lead to a Libyan-supported left-wing regime as in Upper Volta.

Embarrassment to French Government

London WEST AFRICA in English 12 Dec 83 p 2904

[Text]

The foiled, and apparently farcical attempt by former "Emperor" Bokassa to return to power in Bangui (*West Africa*, December 8) has led to an embarrassing situation for the authorities in Abidjan and Paris.

The former leader of the Central African Empire had attempted to return to his throne, from his Abidjan exile, with the help of business interests and accompanied by several French journalists. But President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, on learning of the affair via a telephone conversation with President Mitterrand's adviser Guy Penne, reportedly foiled the plan and ordered Bokassa out of his elegant Abidjan villa and on to the next flight for Paris.

Now installed in his French residence at Yvelines (near the French capital), Bokassa has been besieged by journalists and made to feel distinctly unwelcome by French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson. Speaking in Athens during the EEC Summit, Cheysson said it was "undesirable" that Bokassa stay in France. The French courts, he said, did not recognise Bokassa's French nationality and that he would consequently be "invited to leave France".

A French Foreign Ministry statement said: "President Houphouët Boigny has decided to end the welcome extended to Mr. Bokassa which he had offered in September 1979 at the request of the French authorities."

The French press has been speculating as to the implications of the affair, even suggesting that it could have some import on domestic French politics. A throw-back to the days of former President Giscard's shadowy association with Centrafrican diamonds, this speculation has even reached the front page of *Le Monde*, one of the few pro-Mitterrand French papers; one of the newspaper's senior commentators implied that the return of Bokassa to France could prove embarrassing to Mr. Giscard and President Mitterrand.

The French Foreign Ministry said enquiries were being made for Bokassa to be sent to a third, or fourth, country.

Political trials

Two members of the opposition have been condemned to two years imprisonment after a trial of four men. Hughes Doboze and Dieudonné Padoundji-Yadjoua had been accused of complicity in the May 1982 coup attempt led by Ange Patassé. But the complicity charges did not stick, and they were condemned, rather, for refusing to promise to keep President Kolingba's "political truce" and for demanding the resignation of the President.

The cases of the other two men accused (*West Africa*, December 5), Theodore Bagayombo and Jean-Mete Yapende, were referred back to the prosecutors for further investigation.

CSO: 3400/445

MINISTER CLAIMS ECONOMY SHOWING SIGNS OF RECOVERY

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 30 Nov 83 pp 3-4

[Text] The national economy is showing signs of recovery, in spite of some negative points. Such was the report given by the minister of economy and commerce, Mr Ali Djalbor Diard, who participated in the National Monetary Committee meeting of November 24-26, which was held outside of Chad for the first time, at a site in southern Cameroon. Chad's economic bill of health, presented by the acting director of the Chadian branch of the Bank of Central African States [BCAS] has turned out to be satisfactory. Taking into account the positive results reported this year, the National Monetary Committee gave its approval for the boards of directors of the BCAS and the Development Bank of the Central African States [DBCAS] to open lines of credit to certain industrial firms here.

The National Monetary Committee meeting was held in Lembe, in advance of the BCAS and the DBCAS board meetings, in which Chad's minister of finance and minister of plan and reconstruction took part. As for himself, Mr Ali Djalbor Diard attended the Lembe meeting which addressed three vital subjects: Chad's economic situation, the total contribution of the banks, and the evaluation of rediscount requests. In an interview on Chadian National Broadcasting, the head of the economy pointed out the strong points of our economy. Cotton production increased from 102,000 metric tons to 115,000 metric tons as a result of the rise in prices per kilogram. Food crops also marked an increase over last year: Food production went from 410,000 metric tons to 460,000 metric tons, reducing the food deficit by 50,000 metric tons. Banda sugar production also increased. Last year, it was 22,000 metric tons and it will reach 24-25,000 metric tons this season. Even if they are slight, these increases will have a positive effect on the activities of such companies as CotonTchad and SONASUT (National Sugar Company of Chad), which also benefited from protective measures taken by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Textile Company of Chad (TCC) and the Cigarette Manufactory of Chad (CMC), however, are in a bad way, adversely affected by competition from imported products. Studies are being made by the supervisory agency concerned to enable the firms to overcome their difficulties, as the main obstacle lies in marketing their outputs. The ban on sugar imports took the pressure off SONASUT. Will the ban on clothing and cigarette imports have the same effect on TCC and CMC? The question will be answered as studies are completed at the Commerce Directorate.

The satisfactory situation of the cotton and sugar campaigns weighed heavily in the National Monetary Committee's decisions in evaluating rebate requests. The committee thus approved the application made by CotonTchad for a campaign credit of 14 billion [CFA francs]. SONASUT will also obtain a committee-approved credit for 1.5 billion [CFA francs]. As for the other firms, the minister of economy deplored the lack of information needed for the participants in the Lembe meeting to be able to reach a decision. It should be noted that industrial firms existing in Chad have not received credits from the BCZS since 1978. This is due to the weakness of bank facilities. The international Bank for Africa of Chad, the only primary bank in the country, saw its quota increase from 470 million to 800 million [CFA francs], to enable it to meet its many needs.

The minister of economy also indicated that the housing credit granted to Chadian government employees and businessmen is experiencing certain difficulties because dossiers have not been submitted. This is the reason why he asked both parties to fill out their dossiers--to be submitted to CNB--more quickly.

From this overview of the national economy, it becomes clear that the recovery is real, in spite of a few weaknesses. The efforts made by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce are producing results. With the credits granted by the BCAS, the signs of recovery detailed here will become stronger, if rigour is used.

12413

CSO: 3419/231

THREE FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENTS SIGNED

Brazzaville MWETI in French 29 Nov 83 p 2

[Excerpt] Three agreements and a draft agreement were signed on Saturday at the Ministry of Cooperation between the Congo, represented by the secretary general for cooperation, Comrade Abel Wilson N'Dessabeka, and France, represented by Jacques Languellem, counselor to the French Cooperation Mission.

1. Financing Agreement No 153/DPL/83/COG for the "Lina-Congo Recovery" Plan.

The financing total is set at 2.2 million French francs, or 110 million CFA francs, and breaks down as follows:

*Support to Lina-Congo [520,000 French francs]

The French side promises to provide Lina-Congo with logistical support of 11 experts for 1 year.

These experts will also participate in training counterparts and staff of Lina-Congo.

*Support to the National Civil Aviation Agency [ANAC] [1.68 million Fr francs]

The French Government promises to carry out the following tasks during the next 2 years with the assistance of the National Management Institute (ING) and the ITA [expansion unknown]:

--Development of approach procedures for the secondary airfields of Impfondo, Ouesso, Owando, Djambala, Sibiti, Loubomo, Makabana and Soudi.

--Revision of the legislation on aviation, and drafting of the Congolese civil aviation code.

*Complementary Projects

Provide study resources for training at the National Civil Aviation School (EMAC) consisting of up to two pilots and a mechanic-navigator officer per year, for a 3-year period.

2. Financing Agreement No 258/C/DPL/83/CNG for the project: "Establishment of a National Program for Human-Use Water Supply"

The financial assistance by the Government of the French Republic to the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo, set at 2 million Fr francs, or 10 million CFA francs, is intended to carry out the following:

The 1982-1986 5-year plan stressed the need to develop the national territory with the objective of slowing the rural exodus.

In this context, The Congolese Government has decided to undertake a policy of developing human water supply to provide the people with a modern drinking water supply. This policy meshes with the policy of establishing village centers.

The government has thus decided to establish a water organization. Its tasks will be to carry out studies of water inventory and water needs, develop a master plan for water use, and plan the measures to be taken.

The first stage of the project, the subject of this agreement, which runs for 3 years, involves providing to the Ministry of Mines and Energy within 12 months a hydrogeological engineer, assisted by a hydrological VSN [expansion unknown] geophysicist. These two technical advisers will train the two Congolese engineers and the technician assigned to the organization.

For its part, the Congolese Government undertakes to:

- Provide space and furniture for the offices.

- Obtain two engineers and a technician, a typist-secretary, and a draftsman.

3. Financing agreement No 302/C/DPL/83/CNG for the project of "Support to the Major Diseases Service"

The cost of the project is set at 1 million Fr francs, or 50 million CFA francs.

The objective is to provide supplementary resources to the operational components in the combat against major diseases. It covers both:

- Assistance through personnel;

- Aid in equipment and operation of the Epidemiology and Major Diseases Service.

9920

CSO: 3419/245

ROAD PROJECT REPORTEDLY IN FULL IMPLEMENTATION

Brazzaville BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'ACI in French 29 Nov 83 p 2

[Text] Brazzaville, 1 Dec--The Owando-Makoua-Ouessou road project is fully underway in the south. The French Ducler company, which began the project 2 years ago, expects to complete it in July 1987.

Four major engineering projects are planned along this 310-kilometer road: bridges over the Kouyou at Owando, the Likouala at Makoua, the Mambili and the Lengue.

The bridge over the Koyou, on which work is at a very advanced stage, is constructed of prestressed concrete and is 154.8 meters long. Its height of 7.5 meters permits free passage on the river. According to Mr Moullec, chief of the engineering section, the work on this bridge will be virtually complete at the beginning of July 1984.

At the same time, work is also continuing on the bridge over the Likouala. This 191.5-meter bridge is being built at the present ferry location. After having located the engineering yard, the project is now in the deforestation stage. This bridge will be of the same construction design as the Kouyou bridge.

To facilitate supply of stone, a quarry was located 33 kilometers from Makoua on the Etoumbi road. The tests were positive, so stone will no longer have to be brought from Brazzaville, thus saving 70 percent of materials cost.

The construction team began at Ouessou because the materials for the roadway are located to the north.

However, the construction has been slowed at times because of various difficulties encountered, mainly in transportation of certain materials. Loaded at the port of Bordeaux in France, these have had to come through Cameroon, Zaire or the port of Pointe-Noire. The rainy season now underway in the Cuvette and Sangha areas has also been a serious handicap.

The Owando-Makoua-Ouessou road, whose initial cost will be 35 billion CFA francs, is one of the priority projects under the first 5-year plan. It will open up the northern part of the country and thus stimulate agricultural and mining activity. A total of 522 Congolese of all levels are participating in carrying out this project of national importance. (ACI)

9920

CSO: 3419/245

BRIEFS

REYA DELEGATIONS VISIT USSR, PDRY--Two REYA [Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association] delegations returned to Addis Ababa yesterday after completing their visits to the USSR and the PDRY. The eight-man delegation led by Comrade Tezazu Tefera, head of the planning, research and improvement department in the REYA Central Committee, participated in an exchange of experience seminar in the USSR, at the invitation of Komsomol. The 25-man delegation led by Comrade Abebe Hankore, head of the department for the organization in the REYA Central Committee, returned to Addis Ababa after participating in preparatory work for the Ethiopia-Yemen Youth Week held from 25th to 30th December. [Excerpt] [EA020522 Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic 1000 GMT 1 Jan 84]

CSO: 3403/10

MOJA LEADER GIVES VIEWS ON SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION

London AFRICA NOW in English Dec 83 p 17

[Text]

The Confederation between The Gambia and Senegal is leading to the annexation of the former because each of the 15 protocols erodes its sovereignty. This is the view of the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA-Gambia), an organisation strongly opposed to the Confederation.

While visiting London recently, Ousman Manjang, member of MOJA's Central Committee and representative in Europe based in Sweden, told *Africa Now*: "MOJAZ has grown from a small human rights organisation to a strong political movement to fight against Senegalese occupation of The Gambia."

He said that ordinary Gambians did not find any interest in the Confederation. It was a marriage of convenience for the politicians who were worried about their security. "But in the process The Gambia is losing its independence," Manjang told *Africa Now*.

Senegalese soldiers moved into The Gambia in July 1981 to put down an abortive attempt to overthrow the government of Sir Dauda Jawara. MOJA, which was opposed to the ruling Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), was not in favour of the coup move but it was also against Senegalese intervention.

MOJA's Manjang explained: "We were against the coup. It was untimely because the masses still believed that there were possibilities of changing the government within the framework of the constitution. While we were against the coup, we did not see it as the affair of the Senegalese. They used it as a pretext to violate Gambian sovereignty."

Now that the Senegalese are entrenched, relations between them and the local population have been soured. There have been allegations that the Senegalese soldiers are becoming more and more repressive. They have been accused of rape and murder and there is constant tension between the 6,000 soldiers and the small Gambia Field Force.

Was there any hope that things might change for the better? Manjang thought so: "One of the major factors in our favour is that the majority of Gambians are opposed to the Confederation and to Senegalese occupation. Even in Senegal, 11 of the 15 political parties are against occupation of The Gambia and the Confederal arrangements.

"There is also the fact that both countries are having major economic problems and would therefore find it hard to maintain the Confederation and Senegalese soldiers. Also, Senegal has its own internal problems. There are regions which are calling for secession — for example Cassamance, where there was an uprising last December.

"But most important is the determination of Gambians to free themselves from the shackles of the Senegalese. Any annexation will never be stable."

MOJA was formed in December 1979 "because of the growing deterioration of the social and economic fabric in The Gambia and because of the lack of any alternative political movement to remedy the situation," Manjang explained:

"There was an absence of genuine mass organisations which were independent of the government to provide channels for the manifestation of opposition.

"In MOJA there were members from all walks of life, including politicians. We were able to organise cells throughout the country. It was not long before the government moved against us."

The coup attempt of 1981 was the climax of the confrontation between the PPP and MOJA. Most of the latter's members were forced to flee abroad where MOJA is functioning very well. "Abroad, our work must be seen in the light of the number of Gambian exiles which has tripled in the last two years. Between 32-40% of young people under 30 are out of the country," Manjang said.

Within The Gambia, MOJA has been able to re-organise despite the fact that many of its members have been detained,

killed or forced into exile, according to Manjang. "We've even infiltrated the establishment," he told *Africa Now*.

But the government is hitting back. According to Manjang, the authorities are using food as a political weapon against its opponents. He said 63% of the food consumed between June 1982 and June this year was food aid.

"The government monopolises distribution of this food and it is an effective method of political repression. The food is distributed through District Commissioners who must be PPP members, chiefs, village heads and local PPP chairmen. Those who don't actively support the PPP, the Confederation or the presence of Senegalese soldiers don't get any part of this aid," Manjang told *Africa Now*. For The Gambia, a country of only half-a-million people, such measures may have grave repercussions ●

CSO: 3400/442

BRIEFS

CDC INVESTMENT IN GAFP--The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) is to make a long-term investment of £0.988mm, four-fifths in loan and one-fifth in equity, in the Gambian Agricultural and Fisheries Ltd (GAFP). GAFP wants to build a £3.6m fish processing and cold storage complex at Banjul, to facilitate greater exploitation of the country's fisheries resources, said by the FAO to be among the least depleted along the West African coast. The complex which will include a chill room and cold storage, a fish processing unit with blast plate freezers, an ice making plant and store, and a fish smoking facility is to be built by two British companies, Lancaster Construction Ltd and Fishtech International Ltd, which are taking shares in the company. The capacity will be 5,000 tonnes of fish a year to be mainly exported. The project is co-financed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Gambian Government, whose contribution will come from a loan provided by the European Investment Bank. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3461, 12 Dec 83 p 2898]

CSO: 3400/444

NEW REVENUE COLLECTION OFFICE ESTABLISHED

AB221017 Accra Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 22 Dec 83

[Text] The Citizen's Vetting Committee [CVC], established under Provisional National Defense Council [PNDC] law 1, has been renamed the Office of the Revenue Commissioners. Under the Office of the Revenue Commissioners law signed by the chairman of the PNDC yesterday, the new office shall monitor the operations of all revenue agencies responsible for the central government revenue and investigate persons whose lifestyle and expenditures substantially exceed their known or declared income. It shall also perform the functions of the special task court under the income tax amendment law 1983, PNDC law 61, as well as try all offenses arising under the income tax decree and the customs and excise decree and other revenue laws.

The power vested in the former CVC to investigate persons whose bank accounts exceed 50,000 cedis has been removed. Persons are therefore not to be investigated on the basis of their bank balances.

In another development, the Office of the Revenue Commissioners, formerly the CVC, has announced a package deal for all persons who may be called to appear before it. Every income earner who voluntarily goes to declare his hitherto undeclared income or wealth to the central revenue department and fully pays the appropriate taxes would be leniently considered by the Office of the Revenue Commissioners. For this purpose, a grace period of 3 months, from 31 December 1983 to 31 March 1984, is granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Revenue Commissioners will intensify its activities and anyone found by the committee after the deadline to have concealed his incomes or wealth will be given the appropriate penalty under the existing law of the commission.

All frozen bank accounts, that is all bank accounts which were frozen by the PNDC after 31 December 1981 because they were above 50,000 cedis, are hereby defrozen. All treasury bills and stocks may now be redeemed without reference to the Office of the Revenue Commissioners. This however does not apply to bank accounts and assets specifically frozen by the PNDC.

CSO: 3400/450

BRIEFS

JAPANESE ROAD REHABILITATION GRANT--Ghana and Japan today signed an agreement on a Japanese grant of about \$2.1 million for road rehabilitation. The secretary for foreign affairs, Dr Obed Asamoah, signed on behalf of the government while the Japanese ambassador to Ghana, Mr Naoki Nakano, initialled for his country. Dr Obed Asamoah observed that the grant, which is the second of its kind, is one in a series of Japanese grants to assist Ghana in her economic recovery program. He said Japan has been assisting Ghana in areas like fishing, medical research, transport, and communications. She has also made grants to her for the importation of food and agricultural equipment. Dr Obed Asamoah thanked the government and the people of Japan for this gesture and hoped the cordial relations that exist between the two countries, which form the basis of the assistance, will continue. On his part, the Japanese ambassador said the PNDC's [Provisional National Defense Council] measures for economic rehabilitation are attracting the attention of developed countries to offer assistance to Ghana. He hoped the new set of road construction machinery will be fully utilized. [Text] [AB221620 Accra Domestic Service in English 1300 GMT 22 Dec 83]

APPEALS COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED--The exact operation of the right of appeal for a review of decisions of the national public tribunal has been set up. Speaking to GBC [Ghana Broadcasting Corporation] news in an exclusive interview today, the attorney-general and commissioner for justice, Mr J.E.K. Aikins, said these appeals will be heard by a committee that has been set up for the purpose. The committee, which is just about to start work, has the attorney general or his nominee as a member. Others are the coordinator for vettings investigations and tribunals, a member of the public board of tribunals, and a nominee each of the National Defense Committee and the Prisons' Service Council. Mr Aikins said all aggrieved persons not satisfied with decisions of the tribunal have to appeal first to the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] from where it will be sent to the appeals committee. The committee's decisions will then be forwarded to the PNDC which has the right to accept or reject the decision. The attorney-general says all those already serving prison terms and others sentenced in absentia can appeal against their judgement. [Text] [AB231855 Accra Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 23 Dec 83]

CURFEW IMPOSED ON BAWKU--A dusk-to-dawn curfew has been imposed on Bawku following intercommunal fighting between Mamprusis and Kusasis. According to our correspondent, three people have been killed and nine others seriously injured. The immediate cause of the fighting is not known. The secretary for Upper East, John Ndeburgre, has visited the scene of the fighting. Police and military personnel have been deployed to the area to help maintain law and order. [Text] [AB251358 Accra Domestic Service in English 1300 GMT 25 Dec 83]

CSO: 3400/450

KENYA

BRIEFS

FRG AID AGREEMENT SIGNED--The minister for finance and planning, Prof George Saitoti, and the West German ambassador to Kenya Mr Johannes Von Vacano today signed two agreements for a total sum of 100 million shillings. The agreement for 100 million shillings will be used to purchase goods in the agricultural, transport and industrial sectors as well as in the postal, telecommunications and railways [as heard]. The other 5 million shillings, which is a grant, is to finance feasibility studies for future projects. The projects will be financed by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Speaking on behalf of the Kenya Government, Prof Saitoti thanked the West German Government for its continued partnership in Kenya's development. [figures as heard] [Text] [EA282201 Nairobi Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 28 Dec 83]

CSO: 3400/467

BRIEFS

USSR AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE NAMED--The ambassador-designate of the USSR to Mali is Yevgeniy Nersesov, who was appointed by a decree issued in Moscow today. Mr Nersesov, who is 62 years old, entered the service in 1951. He was appointed ambassador to Morocco after serving as the head of the USSR diplomatic mission in Chad from 1974 and 1978. He replaces Malik Fazylov who has been here since 1976 and who has been appointed the ambassador to Rabat. [Text] [AB260835 Bamako Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 24 Dec 83]

WHEAT, RICE FROM ALGERIA, USSR--Bamako, 4 Jan (AFP)--Algeria has granted Mali 2,000 tons of wheat flour in food aid, it has been learned in Bamako. The aid comes in addition to a gift of agricultural equipment (about 10 tractors, trailers, and tank trailers) presented to the Malian authorities last week. These gifts, which are designed to support Mali's authorities in their struggle against the effects of the drought, will be complemented by an Algerian contribution to a well-sinking program in the region along the Mali-Algeria border. For its part, the USSR will donate to Mali 1,000 tons of rice, said the Soviet ambassador to Mali, who specified that the cost of transport of the food aid will be met by the Soviet side, adding that this is in response to Mali's appeal for assistance to the masses of people affected by the drought. [Text] [AB041115 Paris AFP in French 1010 GMT 4 Jan 84]

CSO: 3419/286

CONSTRUCTION OF CORUMANE, PEQUENOS LIBOMBOS DAMS UNDER WAY

Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese 4 Dec 83 pp 31-37

[Article by Fernando Lima: "Dams: to Control the Wealth Drained Into the Sea"]

[Text] Corumane and Pequenos Libombos are two dams currently under construction in Maputo Province. With dimensions quite different from one another, nevertheless their purpose is the same: to control the wealth drained into the sea and thus ensure water for farming and livestock raising, and to normalize the water supply for the city of Maputo, in the case of the dam over the Umbeluzi.

Yellow grass and bare trees are the prevailing landscape along the road heading toward Sabie. This, together with other sections of Gaza and Inhambane, is one of the areas hardest hit by the drought besetting Southern Africa.

A few wells on the rocky road indicate the recent rainfall in the area during November. Women and children are collecting the muddy water in cans, while threatening bony livestock vie for space on the road with the vehicles using it.

Fifteen kilometers beyond Sabie, a bustling prefabricated village, there appears one of the daring projects undertaken in independent Mozambique.

Corumane is the name of the dam which an Italian consortium, contracted by the Mozambican Government, proposes to built in 48 months.

However, it is not the only hydraulic project being executed in Maputo Province: Actually, 40 kilometers from the capital, work has also begun, at the start of the year, on the Pequenos Libombos dam on the Umbeluzi River, the source of the city's drinking water supply.

Origin of the Projects

Studies were made on the two dams before Mozambique became independent. The basic design for the Pequenos Libombos construction was even completed in 1974, when the shortages in the water supply for what was then Lourenco Marques were more than obvious.

During the Third FRELIMO [Mozambican Liberation Front] Congress, held in 1977, Corumane and Pequenos Libombos were listed in the Social and Economic Directives as projects to be started in 1980.

Meanwhile, the designs have been completed as well as the international contacts to find financiers for such extensive undertakings.

It was from Italy, currently Mozambique's leading Western economic partner, that the construction of the two dams received the greatest receptiveness.

The period of severe recession that was being experienced then in particular also had a considerable influence on the decision, when one realizes that loans act as an incentive to national industries in a time of crisis.

In addition to the Italian loans, Pequenos Libombos has the participation of ADB (African Development Bank), ADF (African Development Fund) and, to a lesser extent, the Portuguese banks, which back the services rendered by companies in this country involved in the project.

Goals to be Attained

The Corumane dam will be established in an area traditionally stricken by the lack of rainfall. Indexes available from the Meteorological Services show the meager pluviometric precipitation recorded in the Sabie region.

Supplying water for farming and livestock raising is one of the goals to be attained. The Sabie River, originating in South Africa, "where it provides drinking water for the animals in the Krueger Park reservation," empties into the Incomati, on the banks of which major agro-industrial enterprises, such as the sugar enterprises, have been set up.

This year, the drought phenomenon caused the sea water to flow upstream of the river, threatening the soil of the Incomati sugar enterprise, established in Xinavane. The same situation affected Maragra, in Manhica, although the salinity problem there is regarded as "a chronic situation."

Hence, the regulation of volumes of flow is another goal to be attained, minimizing the effects of a flood or an abnormal drop in water volume. Although they have different dimensions, Corumane and Pequenos Libombos serve identical purposes.

In the case of the dam over the Umbeluzi, there is also a concern to normalize the water supply for Maputo, an undertaking that will have to be supplemented by an increase in the capacity for impoundment and treatment of the water, as shown by the last rainfall which was not, even on this account, reflected in a larger amount of water at the disposal of the city's population.

After the field work was started, the idea of establishing small hydroelectric powerplants at the two dams began to take shape. The studies are under way, and there are indications that the option might soon be actually implemented, although there may be a secondary structural plan.

The Partners Involved

The Corumane dam was designed by the Portuguese company Hidrotecnica Portuguesa, which is simultaneously responsible for the inspection. The project was awarded to an Italian consortium set up specifically for this purpose, which took the name COBOCO, resulting from the participation of Condote d'Aqua, Bonifica Spa and the League of Cooperatives.

The Pequenos Libombos project, in turn, belongs to the firm Hidroprojecto Portuguesa, and is being executed by an Italian consortium (Stradecop), comprised of Italstrade and the League of Cooperatives. The inspection is shared by Coyne et Bellier of France, Enge-Rio of Brazil and the Portuguese firm Oman.

The Mozambican Government, through the National Water Directorate, is the owner of the project, and has assigned two engineers to be in charge of the plans

Technical Features

Both Corumane and Pequenos Libombos are earth-fill dams, with a concrete section in the overflow spillway tower.

The only enterprise of these dimensions existing in Mozambique is the Massingir dam built on the Elefantes River. Problems involving water leakage in the foundation have not yet allowed for the use of this project's maximum liquid storage capacity.

The Corumane dam will have a total length of nearly 3,000 meters and a maximum height of 46 meters, while its twin on the Umbeluzi will be 1,600 meters long and a maximum of 45 meters high.

The dam on the Sabie involves the movement of nearly 8.5 million cubic meters of fill and the use of 170,000 cubic meters of concrete. Its lagoon, extending over 68 square kilometers, will have a storage capacity estimated at 1,200 million cubic meters of water. The irrigation area to be benefited by Corumane is indicated as 36,000 hectares, but the more skeptical technicians are considering smaller figures.

The construction, started on 25 January of this year, is scheduled to end by January 1987, its estimated cost being \$110 million (approximately 6 million contos).

The Pequenos Libombos dam, for its part, requires 4 million cubic meters of fill. The concrete and the hydromechanical equipment account for 40 percent of the total cost of the project. The flooded area will be 50 square kilometers, storing 440 million cubic meters of water. The benefit for irrigated farming will amount to 17,000 hectares, and its total cost is \$70 million. The delivery time for the project is 42 months.

Pace of the Work

In Corumane, on a small hill devoid of vegetation and beaten by an inclement sun, 80 prefabricated houses are being erected, to be used by the workers and technicians involved in the dam. Over an area of 6,000 square meters, there are also offices, technical premises, a medical station, a lodging place, two mess halls and an Italian school.

The houses for the transferred workers are considered an important factor for the progress of the project. One of those in charge of the enterprise remarks: "Minimal reestablishment of the family environment breaks the tension and creates a different atmosphere in this work, which requires a large amount of physical and psychological stress."

The camp which, in the future, may be another urban center indicated on the map, will also have a pool and tennis courts "to break the isolation and diversify the use of spare time." For the present, they are benefits given to the foreign community established there.

On the side in the direction of the river, the industrial zone, the rock-crushing center and the concrete center are under construction.

The Mozambican in charge of the project explains: "The most intense work will begin in April."

It will be then that the dam itself will start to grow. The work performed is multiplying on several fronts, ranging from the preparation of the provisional diversion channel for the river to the conduits for the discharge at the base, the cofferdam and the preparation of the foundation for the dam.

A probing team is meticulously continuing its work to determine with the maximum precision possible the geological profile along the dam axis.

Based on a clause in the contract, the Italian contractors are also responsible for the construction of the Sabie-Corumane road, a section about 16 kilometers long. The construction should already have been completed, but the setbacks that have occurred will prevent it from materializing until March 1984.

The residential zone in Pequenos Libombos is being finished. Arranged in the same pattern as that of Corumane, the houses have nevertheless been built of brickwork and tile, consisting of 180 units virtually completed. The final details are currently being applied by carpenters, pipefitters and electricians.

At the work site, the industrial yard has already been finished, and the concrete and stone-crushing centers are being tested.

The Umbeluzi River was diverted from its normal course in April, and then the cofferdam, which will allow for the continuation of the work on the dry foundations and security to continue, was erected.

A slight obstacle occurred upon the increase in the Umbeluzi's volume of flow. The access to the side opposite the residential zone, the work center to be exact, had to be made across the Namaacha road, an additional section of 25 kilometers. The bridge over the Umbeluzi, planned for the next few weeks, will eliminate this temporary problem.

Labor

Not very far from Sabie, 35-ton trucks and gigantic excavators are continuing at a fearful pace the removal and moving of earth. The rock elevation through which the conduits will pass for the base discharge and the overflow spillway are "dismantled" with the use of explosives.

Finding skilled labor was a problem, and continues to be such. The contractors even went so far as to suggest the recruitment of workers in an Oriental country for what they considered "total fulfillment of their commitments."

Moreover, it is customary in the North African and Gulf countries to involve labor from the Mediterranean countries of Europe and from the Far East.

Despite the difficulties confronted, the use of Mozambican workers has proven to be positive. Their dedication to work and willingness to learn have been recognized by everyone.

A substantial part of this work force consists of former migrant workers in the South African mines. Many have even handled heavy machinery. However, they lack knowledge of the best utilization and maintenance of the equipment.

On a project of major scope with stipulated contractual deadlines, the level of requirements is very high. Failure to carry out operations within the fixed periods could cause large fines on both sides (for the contractor or for the owner of the project who bears responsibility for guaranteeing supplies of cement, iron, lumber, explosives and fuels). At critical junctures in the projects, floodlights are installed so that the work can continue for 24 hours. This has not been necessary at present, but with the approach of the crucial phase of the work, night shifts will be started.

The two dams employ over 1,000 men. An attempt has been made to have the level of wages based on the degree of demands placed on the workers.

The intention is to make the wage in keeping with the competence and responsibility of each individual, using as a basis the indicators of a project with the aforementioned features.

Creating responsibility for the work being performed and for the equipment being handled entails a wage correspondence that is not always evident to the "bala-laika" bureaucrats swarming in the various offices of human resources scattered over the country, bound to the devious ways of 4/80.

The philosophy pursued in the hard work on the dams is aimed at obtaining the maximum output from men and machines employed. So that this may occur, there must be a guarantee of wages that are minimally fair, good food and local housing that will prevent long commuting.

A technician already worn out from traveling about "big projects" asks: "What responsibility can be demanded of a driver with 4 contos in his pocket and 10 hours of work per day under his belt?"

On this job, in addition to the wages and overtime, consideration is being given to introducing material incentives, rewarding everyone for output and productivity.

The same technician argues: "If someone is killed working here, it is only fair that there be just compensation for his effort."

Lack of Cadres

As a problem of national dimensions, the lack of skilled personnel is also an enigma for the Maputo dams. There is a shortage of foremen, stone workers, electricians and topographers, not to mention specialists in civil and mechanical construction.

Each of the enterprises is a small university, in which knowledge is applied and tested. It is for this very reason that technicians with international reputations pay regular visits to Corumane and Pequenos Libombos, in order to monitor applications of technology and tests.

It is undertakings such as these that could serve as a school for training Mozambican cadres, and as a springboard for national initiatives in the hydraulic field.

The proposition of proliferating large dams in a country currently facing a shortage of technical and financial resources is questionable. However, the "acquired school" would make it possible to set up national enterprises specializing in the construction of small earth-fill dams and agricultural hydraulics that are so necessary for developing the rural economy.

A coffer, a small earth-fill dam, can solve some of the problems of a rural community, contributing to the control of water, one of our vital resources.

2909

CSO: 3442/99

SOVIET AMBASSADOR PRESENTS EQUIPMENT, FOOD AID

MB300946 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1700 GMT 29 Dec 83

[Text] The Soviet ambassador in Maputo today donated several articles to the Mozambique Government, part of them for drought victims. The articles include 7,000 tons of rice, more than 4,000 tons of machinery and equipment such as tractors, agricultural machinery and pipes to open wells in rural regions.

These donations are a true testimony to the solidarity between our country and the Soviet Union. These relations greatly strengthened during the visit of President Samora Machel to the Soviet Union in March this year. When he made the donations, the ambassador of the Soviet Union to Mozambique spoke about the fraternal feelings of the Soviet people toward the Mozambican people:

[Begin recording of Soviet ambassador in Russian with superimposed Portuguese translation] Dear Comrade Minister, Dear Comrades: Once again I want to stress that this rice donation is a testimony to the friendly feelings of the Soviet people toward the Mozambican people and we firmly and openly state that our relations are based on a firm foundation. With a foundation of mutual respect and fraternal help, these relations have a tendency to increase, and to develop still more. There is not and there will not be any doubt about that, and because of this I have the great pleasure of wishing comrade minister a good festive season and a happy new year. We can consider this to be a new year's donation. [End recording]

In thanking the ambassador for the donation, Minister Pascoal Mocumbi said:

[Begin Mocumbi recording] In the name of the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and in the name of our people, we want to express our happiness as we witness here at the Maputo harbor the off loading of the goods that the ambassador has listed and which constitute, in our opinion, yet another example and manifestation of the traditional solidarity of the Soviet Union with the People's Republic of Mozambique. The goods will immediately help minimize the difficulties we face as a result of the drought. They will also enable us to promote self-sufficiency in food production [words indistinct] for all, and some equipment will enable the people to overcome the drought and be able to feed themselves.

We believe that this gesture will contribute to strengthening--it has contributed--the links of friendship and solidarity that have always existed between the Soviet and Mozambican peoples and between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the USSR. [End recording]

BRIEFS

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM ASSISTANCE--In Maputo today Mozambique and the World Food Program [WFP] ratified a plan for urgent food assistance for the populations affected by the drought in Inhambane and Gaza Provinces. Within the framework of the plan the WFP is going to offer our country 27,000 tons of corn, 3,600 tons of beans and 25 tons of other products. The first consignment, due to arrive at the beginning of January, is to include about 6,600 tons of corn. Speaking at the ceremony for the signing for the accord, Aranda da Silva, vice chairman of the Commission for the Prevention of and Fight Against Natural Calamities, said that the aid will contribute to improving the stock of food for the zones considered critical in terms of nutrition. On his part the WFP representative assured that substantial logistical support would be given through an emergency program of road transportation financed by Sweden. [Text] [MB230715 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1700 GMT 21 Dec 83]

EX-PRISONERS IN AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS--The Ministry of Agriculture and the Maputo Executive Council have offered their services to those who have benefited from the No 7-83 which grants pardons for certain sentences. Many people are needed in the scope of the agricultural development programs, and conditions exist for immediate integration of the beneficiaries in the various production fronts. [Text] [MB291203 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0900 GMT 29 Dec 83]

ZIMBABWE VETERANS PROMOTED--Maputo, 30 Dec (AIM/PANA)--Mozambican soldiers who participated in the Zimbabwean war of liberation were yesterday awarded officer rank by President Samora Machel. In a ceremony held in a Maputo stadium, President Samora praised those members of the Mozambican Army who had faced "the shrapnel and the bullets of the Smith regime's troops." These soldiers had then been selected to attend military courses abroad in 1982. A contingent of about 500 Mozambican volunteers had fought inside Zimbabwe side by side with Zimbabwean liberation forces in the closing stages of the war against the illegal minority regime. A second group of Mozambican fighters had assisted the Tanzanian Army in the war against Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. In all, 81 newly appointed officers attended today's ceremony. They included three captains, one major and one lieutenant, while the majority were second lieutenants and sergeants. An officers training course for the defence of Maputo ended on Wednesday. The course closed with a demonstration of martial arts. [Text] [AB301039 Dakar PANA in English 1005 GMT 30 Dec 83]

NAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICAN REFERENDUM VIEWED

Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 4 Nov 83 p 6

[Editorial: "Yes Is Not Yes And No!"]

[Text] The declaration of yes made by South African whites to the new constitutional model was not half-hearted; it was an unambiguous declaration for renewal.

There is nothing, therefore, to impede the government of the Republic of South Africa from moving forward unambiguously in the course which the voters have chosen. If the government were to hesitate in moving forward in implementation as soon as possible, it will deprive itself of the national as well as international gain which this overwhelming yes-vote has provided it.

For South-West Africa, the outcome of the referendum is cause for great optimism.

The pressure on the South African government from the right has snapped. Thus, it need not be feared that the necessary developments that must now take place in South-West Africa need to cause confusion for the government.

We would like to so interpret that the South African voters by implication cast their yes-votes for South-West Africans as well, in order to continue on the road of renewal.

That road has not only been designated in the past, but already cleared to a very important extent. It is the road to self-government and independence.

The administrator-general has repeatedly said that he wants to return control of the central government to the South-West Africans.

And the South African government has consistently attempted over the past 10 years to let South-West Africa develop towards independence.

The group of whites in South-West Africa who in the past have opposed self-government and independence, and who have worked hard for a swing to the right in South African politics, will have to reconsider their role on the road ahead.

They will have to thoroughly ask themselves how they can contribute something positive under the new circumstances.

The answer is obvious: they must stop looking for help from their kindred spirits in South Africa; their best friends are to be found nowhere else but in South-West Africa. And those friends consist of all the peace-loving people whose roots have been put down and intertwined in this country.

Whoever cannot come to an agreement with his fellow citizens does not have friends anywhere who can help. This is as simple as the issue itself.

12271

CSO: 3401/26

NAMIBIA

REPORT ON VISIT TO BORDER POST, CONTACT WITH UNITA

Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN IN Afrikaans 7 Nov 83 p 2

[Article by Andre de Bruyn: "UNITA's Post on South-West African Border"]

[Text] One of the most extraordinary frontier posts in the world was recently set up at Oshikango, on the war-ravaged border between Angola and South-West Africa/Namibia.

On the Angolan side it is manned by a group of UNITA soldiers under the command of a lieutenant. This side is controlled by South African soldiers, also under the command of a young lieutenant.

After much difficulty and with certain stipulations, DIE REPUBLIKEIN was allowed last week to go to Oshikango and see the frontier post. The border may not be crossed, speaking with the UNITA people is not allowed, and the armed forces could not guarantee our safety.

In order to get to Oshikango, approximately 70 km north of Ondangwa, an earth road known as "Land Mine Lane" must be tackled. This road is strewn with the wreckage of cars and small trucks.

Once upon a time, Oshikango must have been a picturesque little frontier town, with buildings painted white, palm trees and tropical vegetation. The buildings that are still standing now are a mirror of the war which rages there. The walls are marked by bullets, rockets and mortars. The area is strewn with bullet shells, witness to the combat that has taken place there.

From the frontier gate, a group of UNITA soldiers can be seen sitting around in the shadow of a building a couple hundred meters away. In the steaming midday heat of about 38 degrees there is little activity.

Earlier reports that UNITA had erected a notice at the border that read "UNITA-Controls-Oshikango" are wrong. There was no trace of such a sign.

From the soldiers' relaxed air it appears that they are indeed in control of that part of Angola and that they do not expect a counterattack by the MPLA or by SWAPO.

On this side of the border, the soldiers are properly dug in, and a neat base with enclosures and guards has been set up. According to members of the security forces, the UNITA fighters are friendly, and their lieutenant and a sergeant come chat from time to time.

Although there is no official connection between the security forces and UNITA, they are nevertheless informal companions in a common struggle against the Russian-supported forces of SWAPO and the MPLA.

The fact that a common frontier post has been established at Oshikango will probably not be recorded in the annals of world history, but it is nevertheless of great strategic importance.

It comes down to the fact that UNITA is now active again in the so-called "no man's land" between Owambo and Angola, and this indicates that their claims of success against the MPLA in Angola's southern Cunene Province are not exaggerated.

The South African armed forces and the South-West African territorial forces are as usual hesitant to provide any commentary on a matter involving UNITA, but it is a well-known fact that SWAPO's terrorists will not readily try to infiltrate those areas where UNITA is.

UNITA's presence in the area north of Owambo can perhaps also be an explanation for SWAPO's low profile there and its intensified activities in the Kavango. SWAPO has never been exactly known for its love of direct confrontation.

Oshikango's frontier post is not yet one of those frontier posts where your passport is stamped before you cross the border, but who knows, in the future this might be the place where tourists can enter a peaceful Angola for vacation.

At this point, the gate is used freely by residents of Angola and Owambo to move back and forth. Animals are chased across the border and Angolans come to do their shopping in Owambo.

"We know that when UNITA's people are in the area, SWAPO and the MPLA will not easily harass us," an Angolan citizen explained to us in Portuguese.

It is an area that exists on top of a powder keg.

12271

CSO: 3401/26

COMMENT ON KALAHARI RAILWAY PLAN

Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaana 9 Nov 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Trans-Kalahari"]

[Text] Long-sighted dreams very often lead to construction projects, the value of which cannot be easily overestimated.

This was the case in our own country with, for example, Hardap and Ruacana.

For many decades, the large dam on the Fish River and the hydroelectric plant at the Ruacana waterfall were merely dreams of the future.

And today these are beneficial realities.

The same may be true with two other such "dreams" from years past.

One is the utilization of the waters of the Okavango and the other is the construction of a trans-Kalahari railroad.

It is good that the administrator-general granted his consent to an examination of the possibilities of such a railroad by a Botswana government consultant group.

By the nature of the matter, there are various facets that must be taken into consideration.

One is the feasibility of constructing such a railroad. Another is the cost of building it.

One more: usefulness. And furthermore: the revenues that it could produce, economy and so on.

And of course the question of how it will influence existing rail connections with regard to cargo and upkeep must be examined.

But there is no doubt that our part of Southern Africa has poor connections with neighboring areas.

The consequences of this are obvious.

The lack of connecting routes hinders progress and development; it lets already backward areas become even more backward.

Therefore, a thorough consideration of the possibilities of this railroad is not only necessary; it would amount to negligence of duty if the background study is not carried out seriously.

12271

CSO: 3401/26

SA COMMENT ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

South Africa's Southwest Policy Questioned

Capetown DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 15 Nov 83 p 10

[Commentary by Professor P.J.J.S.Potgieter, Department of Political Science, Potchefstroom University: "Nature of Political Struggle in South-West Africa 'Misread' "]

[Text] It depends on the success of the multi-party conference which started on Saturday in Windhoek whether the political struggle against SWAPO can also be won. Most observers agree that, even though the military war against SWAPO is going well, the political support for SWAPO is still increasing and that it would very probably win a general election now.

A consolidated internal alternative to SWAPO has not yet developed. That is surprising, especially if one keeps in mind that probably no more than 5 percent of the inhabitants of the area would be interested in the Marxist-socialist system which SWAPO has in prospect for the Southwest.

The first reason for the existing impotence of the internal political parties is that the institutions necessary to carry out a democratic political process have not been sufficiently developed yet. Especially parties among blacks can hardly be seen as political parties in the full sense of the word. Most of them still resemble resistance movements. There is not much discussion of political-economic programs, interaction between the elite and the masses, party organization and party discipline.

But South Africa itself is also being held responsible for the lack of an internal political initiative.

Two errors in the South African Government's handling of the situation in the Southwest should be emphasized. The first is that it "misread" the nature of the political struggle in that area. The second is that it continued to retain a political-socioeconomic system in which the signs of apartheid still are clearly visible.

In the first place, the struggle in the Southwest is too often regarded as only part of the greater attack of communism against Southern Africa. That led to the situation that the true nature of the political struggle in the Southwest is misunderstood.

To state it briefly: the Nama herdsman on a farm near Keetmanashoop is a SWAPO supporter not because he is in favor of SWAPO's Marxist program for an independent Southwest, but because to him SWAPO symbolizes an authentic resistance against white domination and exploitation by South Africa.

Whether the perceptions he has of the whites and of South Africa are correct is not important. The fact is that they exist among many blacks and that this is the reason for their empathy with and support for SWAPO. It means that the political struggle is more a matter of nationalism than of communism. Fighting the struggle against SWAPO on the basis of anti-communism, as has been primarily done so far, thus is the same as fighting an imaginary enemy.

The other obstacle which South Africa itself is placing on the road of a political alternative for SWAPO is that it continues to preserve a system in which color discrimination exists. SWAPO cannot be defeated in the voting booth if apartheid is preserved in the Southwest.

Recalled

Judge Theunie Steyn, the first administrator general of the Southwest, understood that and started to take the necessary steps toward the creation of a society in which blacks would be willing to remove their support from SWAPO. Those steps were of course not very desired by a certain part of the white population, and in those circumstances it was unavoidable to influence South Africa's internal policy.

The political standpoint of the HNP [Herstigste Nasionale Party] and later the Conservative Party, and the potential influence it had on support for the government, forced the government to react emotionally to the unrest in the ranks of white Southwesterners. How could South Africa justify itself morally if it criticized the apartheid system in the Southwest but retained it itself? Subsequently Judge Steyn was recalled and replaced by Dr Gerrit Viljoen, who was ordered to apply the system of ethnic two-level governments.

This happened after South Africa had committed itself in 1978 /not/ to apply the Turnhalle Constitution, because that was not acceptable to the international community due to its ethnic basis. In practice, however, the main concept of the Turnhalle Constitution was continued.

This greatly abated the unrest among whites, but caused great confusion and disruption among other parts of the population. The system created by AG [Administrator General] 1978-1980 is seen by all political groups, except AKTUR [Action Front for the Preservation of Turnhalle Principles], as the greatest obstacle on the road to meaningful political development in the Southwest.

Polarization

AG8 has squelched the Southwest policy back into ethnic paths, while the struggle against SWAPO requires a non-ethnic basis and South Africa itself has formally committed itself to a non-ethnic basis.

Seen in that light, South Africa's own domestic political needs, or more specifically, the polarization within Afrikaner political ranks, is one of the most important causes of the unpleasant situation of Southwest politics of the past few years.

The struggle between the National Party and the Conservative Party, more than the "desires of the people in the area," has been decisive for the manner in which South Africa so far has dealt with the Southwest situation.

There are indications that there are serious attempts on South Africa's part to get an internal political initiative started and in that manner create the circumstances in which Resolution 435 can be applied with greater confidence. It is however doubtful whether much success can be achieved, unless there is better understanding for the fact that in the Southwest one is basically dealing with a decolonization process, which demands different answers from those so far supplied.

Obstacles to SW Political Solution Discussed

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 15 Nov 83 p 11

[Article by Political Correspondent Dries van Heerden: "Rightist Danger in South-West Africa Smaller After 2 November"]

[Text: Important decisions on the domestic policy of South-West Africa as well as the bush war at the border should be an important result of the great Yes victory in the referendum.]

2 November showed that the "rightist danger" in the South African policy is overestimated and that the situation in the Southwest cannot give much momentum to the right either.

Not that one hasn't tried for the past 2 months to drag the Southwest into the referendum campaign. Myths about how the Southwest is being "sold out" were regularly conjured up to urge voters to vote no.

It cannot be denied that fear of rightist action in South African policy was regularly at the back of the mind of those who had to make decisions on the future of the Southwest.

Otherwise why did the promising domestic developments which had started with the Bunnahle Conference ultimately fail due to lack of momentum?

Otherwise why is the controversial AG8 proclamation--which is completely unacceptable to all political parties except Mr Kosie Pretorius' SWA-NP [National Party] and the BNP--still in the code of law?

In general there was only fear that Mr Pretorius and his colleagues would come to the rural Transvaal area again to fan rightist flames about the future of whites in the Southwest.

Hopefully that fear has now abated--only it is a pity that 6 years of political development, which the country could have experienced, have been wasted.

The fact that even the SWA NP realizes its bargaining power in South African politics is decreasing can possibly be seen in the careful feelers the party has started to put out toward the multi-party conference (VPK), which had its first meeting in Windhoek on Saturday.

A political countermeasure to SWAPO in the Southwest itself remains the greatest problem with which decisionmakers have had to cope the past few years.

Mr Dirk Mudge's DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] looked like an alternative. After the domestic election of 1978 there were definite indications that the DTA perhaps could beat SWAPO if it retained its political momentum.

It couldn't manage that, however--usually due to factors out of its control. AG8, which regulates the distribution of government functions, was continuously a handicap to the DTA and for one or another unclear reason there were continuous attempts to divide the DTA and undermine Mr Mudge.

The VPK has certain possibilities of developing into a strong front--but whether it will ever equal the strength of the 1978 model DTA is doubtful.

Together with the DTA, parties such as SWANU, the Damara Council, SWAPO democrats and the Rehoboth liberation party also serve in the VPK. The only thing which apparently unites them is their opposition to the administrator general Dr Willie van Niekerk and his attempts to bring a state council into being.

If the VPK appears to be viable, the possibility could definitely be considered of turning it into an interim government.

An election booth victory against SWAPO still appears unlikely, but a strong front could at least prevent SWAPO from achieving a two thirds majority and from arbitrarily changing the constitution.

Although decisions on domestic policy seem difficult, they are only child's play compared to the problems waiting on the other front--the military area.

The United States and South Africa at least are in agreement that the Cuban presence in Angola is the most important obstacle on the road to an international settlement. The question is: how does one get rid of those foreign soldiers?

One thing is sure . . . as long as the MPLA government is under military pressure, it will never be able to afford to send the Cubans back. If it sees the Cubans as the only buffer between it and a military defeat against UNITA, it will not make any decisions which will endanger its own security.

If the pressure on it is decreased, however, it is just possible that it might judge negotiations with UNITA on the composition of a government more favorably--especially if it can be supplemented with the "carrot" of Western economic aid.

Officially it is denied that South Africa gives aid to UNITA, but it is nevertheless an open secret that a certain "influence" is being exerted on the insurgent organization.

The question which has already puzzled Western diplomats for years is how UNITA and the MPLA will balance each other when their "older brothers"--South Africa and Cuba--withdraw from the struggle.

Various alternatives are possible to find a way out of that dead end. Whatever is decided, the strategic interests of South Africa itself and the security of the inhabitants of the Southwest will of course have to be taken into account thoroughly.

A possible scenario is that UNITA relaxes its military pressure on Luanda and that South Africa withdraws from large parts of southern Angola. As a counter offer the MPLA could use its "influence" over SWAPO to move the terrorists northward and exert control over SWAPO to prevent attacks over the Southwestern border.

The possibility of an international peace force to replace the Cubans, as was proposed only this week by President Shagari of Nigeria, could also be considered.

If the shooting and hostilities stop, it could perhaps create an atmosphere in which the United States could negotiate with the MPLA in a more peaceful manner about the position of the Cubans and a permanent political settlement in Angola itself.

8700

CSO: 3401/29

NIGERIA

NAN SURVEYS IMPACT OF COUP ON MARKETS, PRICES

AB021630 Lagos NAN in English 1620 GMT 2 Jan 84

[Text] Lagos, 2 Jan(NAN)--Soldiers today visited markets in parts of the country in a bid to bring down prices of commodities.

NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA (NAN) investigation showed that at the new Alayabiagba market on the Badagry expressway in Lagos, soldiers tried to force down prices with little positive effect.

According to the investigations, some traders, in Lagos have closed their shops probably to avoid selling at reduced rates. Those interviewed said that the control of prices should start from middlemen who they alleged were responsible for the soaring prices of goods.

Prices of commodities such as detergents, milk, sugar, rice and vegetable oil have, however, remained at the old rates. The long grain rice still sells for between 65 naira and 70 naira per bag as against the control price of 35 naira.

Prices seem to have tumbled in Jos according to NAN investigation: a bag of rice now sells at 30 naira while a bag of semovita which sold for 10 naira now sells at 3 naira 50 kobio. In Kaduna, traders at the city's central market today locked-up their stalls. Some traders told NAN that a crowd of people had tried to force them to sell at reduced prices.

NAN gathered that the people reaction followed a radio and television report yesterday indicating that prices of essential items had fallen. A military police detachment is keeping guard over the market.

At the Ojo-oba market in Ilorin, NAN reports that the market was in disarray while many traders refused to open their stalls for fear of being forced to reduce prices. However, a tin of ground-nut oil which sold at 15 naira now sells at 5 naira, while a packet of omo which sold at 2 naira now sells at 3 k. Similarly, a tine of Peak milk now sells at 20k as against 70k.

In Bauchi, commercial activities in the city's major markets were disrupted as news of the presence of army personnel went round. Traders locked up their stalls for fear that they might be forced to sell their goods at reduced

prices. A trader told NAN that he could not sell a medium-sized omo packet for 50k when [word indistinct] did not buy it at that price. The soldiers who had come to one of the markets expressed dismay at the traders' action. "We are just here to do our normal shopping they said.

Reports from Minna said that traders at the central market closed their stalls following yesterday's stir caused by some men who stormed the market demanding drastic cut in prices of essential commodities.

NAN correspondent in Minna reports that a handful of soldiers came to the market to demand why the stalls were closed without getting an explanation.

CSO: 3400/428

CURRENCY REPORTEDLY WILL BE DEVALUED 'SOON'

AB032144 Paris AFP in English 1811 GMT 3 Jan 84

[Text] London, 3 Jan (AFP)--Nigerian's new military rulers will soon move to devalue that naira by 40 percent, the London financial analysts Maxwell Stamp Associates predicted here today.

The group said the military government could even go ahead with the devaluation without waiting for the conclusion of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The ousted government of President Shehu Shagari had resisted IMF pressures for a devaluation as part of an overall economic recovery package, although Maxwell Stamp three weeks ago said the Shagari administration was resigned to accept the advice.

The group now says that the new Nigerian Government, under Major General Muhammadu Buhari, will probably want to move quickly to impose a greater devaluation than was foreseen prior to the takeover.

A 40-percent fall would bring the naira to rough parity with the U.S. dollar from its official rate of 0.74 to the U.S. currency.

The devaluation would be accompanied or followed by a progressive, partial liberalization of imports, the group said.

Financial circles here estimate that Nigeria's foreign debt lies somewhere between 10 and 15 billion dollars, including some [words indistinct] short term loans.

According to other calculations here, oil revenues, which account for 95 percent of the country's hard currency receipts, will amount to only 10 billion dollars, a sharp drop from the 22 billion received in 1980.

The country's crude oil is now sold at roughly 30 dollars a barrel, against 40 dollars in 1980, while production has fallen since then from 2.4 barrels a day to 1.3 million as a result of quotas determined by the organization of petroleum exporting countries.

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

FUEL SHORTAGE AT KANO--Kano, 3 Jan (NAN)--Fuel scarcity has hit Kano metropolis and its environs, a NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA (NAN) correspondent reports. The correspondent said that almost all the filling stations had no fuel with the exception of African Petroleum and Petrol. As a result, long queues of vehicles at the filling stations extending up to major roads causing serious traffic jams. [sentence as received] The NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Company] depot chief, Mr T.S. Ede, told NAN that work was going on smoothly as tankers could be seen being loaded with fuel. A dealer, however, blamed the problem on the NNPC. Roadside fuel dealers now resort to selling a kerosene tin of fuel at between 6 naira and 7 naira instead of 4 naira. [Text] [AB031120 Lagos NAN in English 1100 GMT 3 Jan 84]

STUDENTS SUPPORT NEW REGIME--The students union of the University of Ibadan has called on the new military regime to seize and confiscate all assets illegally acquired by politicians during the previous administration. Pledging support for the new regime, the students union urged the military authorities to freeze the accounts of all the political rulers kept in the country's banks. While calling on the military to tackle the economic problems with military precision, the union urged the new government to ensure fundamental human rights which the last administration violated. The students union also called for the confiscation and sale of privately-owned jet planes bought during the last administration, suggesting that the proceeds should be used to import raw materials for manufacturing industries. It also called on the new military regime to probe and reorganize public corporations and parastatals such as the NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation], NEPA [Nigerian Electric Power Authority], the Nigeria Ports Authority, and the Customs and Excise. [Text] [AB031704 Ibadan Domestic Service in English 1430 GMT 3 Jan 84]

BUHARI PRAISED FOR PATRIOTISM--Calabar, 3 Jan (NAN)--The former state secretary of the banner Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), Chief Adam Hogan today commended the courage, foresight, dedication, and patriotism in effecting a bloodless change of government in the country. In a statement issued in Calabar, Chief Hogan pledged the loyalty and cooperation of the defunct state executive of the party with the new administration at both the federal and state levels. We pray the almighty God in his infinite wisdom to guide the head of state, Maj-General Muhammadu Buhari and members of the supreme military council in evolving equitable and lasting measures that would resuscitate the dead national economy. He said that the names of those courageous men of honour would be written in letters of gold in the annals of Nigerian history. [Text] [AB031458 Lagos NAN in English 1345 GMT 3 Jan 84]

PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY--Enugu, 3 Jan (NAN)--The Anambra State Presidential Liaison Office (PLO) in Enugu has been instructed today to ensure that all government property and documents are not illegally tampered with and to pack up all CVU [Conference Vehicles Unit] vehicles in the office compound. A NAN correspondent found that some soldiers went to the office this morning and took some of the PLO workers to Enugu army garrison to give them the instruction. NAN found that the PLO office is being run by an administrative secretary since the presidential liaison officer was dismissed following the military coup. [Text] [AB031450 Lagos NAN in English 1340 GMT 3 Jan 84]

BENIN CITY PRICES DROP--Benin, 3 Jan (NAN)--Prices of some essential commodities fell drastically in most commercial areas of Benin city yesterday because of momentary presence of soldiers, a NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA (NAN) correspondent in Benin reports. At the Lagos street commercial area, members of the public bought detergents of varied sizes that hitherto sold for between 1.80 and 7.50 naira at between 30 kobo and N2.50 and a tin of Peak milk at 20K as against the former price of 70K. Motor tyre dealers at Forestry, Eben and James Watt Streets, in the full glare of soldiers, sold out tyres to interested members of the public at between N30 and N50 as against former prices of between N160 and N200. NAN correspondent who visited the same shops this morning, reported that all sizes of motor tyres have "disappeared" from the few shops that opened, while most wholesale provision stores in the state capital were locked. One of the soldiers at Eben Street who, however, chose to be anonymous, told NAN that "there is no basis for the high cost of these items, if they can fall now, they must always fall." [Text] [AB031320 Lagos NAN in English 1225 GMT 3 Jan 84]

PHASING OUT ABUJA PROJECT--Lagos, 4 Jan (NAN)--The Nigeria Council for National Awareness said in Lagos today that the Abuja Project should be phased out to cover a period [of] 15 years to make the (?nation's) [words indistinct] current economic plight. In a statement on the military intervention the council also said that the petrochemical industry and the LNG project must be given top priority. It called for the dissolution of parastatals and government companies especially the Nigerian National Supply Company stressing that rice should be sold for less than N30 per bag all over the country. On public officers who served from 1979-1983, the council said that they should be made to declare the assets publicly. It also said that all beneficiaries of import licenses and government contracts from 1976 to 1983 should be published. The council stressed the need to ensure press freedom at all costs in order to assist the nation in its bid to recover. [Text] [AB041817 Lagos NAN in English 1543 GMT 4 Jan 84]

CSO: 3400/432

SOMALIA

BRIEFS

NEW INDUSTRIAL JOURNAL LAUNCHED--The Somali minister for industry, Maj Gen Abdalla Mohamed Fadil, this morning held a press conference at the headquarters of the Ministry of Industry where he launched a new quarterly journal entitled INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW. The journal will be published in English. The press conference was attended by representatives of the Somali media and other international organizations such as UNDP, UNIDO, USAID as well as other organizations which assist in the development activities of Somalia. [Excerpt]
[EA282131 Mogadishu Domestic Service in Somali 1115 GMT 28 Dec 83]

CSO: 3403/10

SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTPANSBERG, PINETOWN BY-ELECTIONS NOTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 Dec 83 p 6

[Editorial: "By-elections"]

[Text] The Soutpansberg and Pinetown by-elections on February 15 will show whether the massive support the Government received in the referendum reflects a new and changing political scene.

This will be Soutpansberg's second by-election.

The first came about when Mr Fanie Botha, the then Minister of Manpower, made his reckless challenge to Dr Andries Treurnicht to resign his seat and fight a by-election--Mr Botha in Soutpansberg and Dr Treurnicht in Waterberg.

Dr Treurnicht retained his seat with ease, his majority of 1 894 being up on his 1981 majority of 1 461.

This was a three-cornered contest, Dr Treurnicht not only fighting off a challenge from the NP but also from the Herstigte Nasionale Party leader, Mr Jaap Marais.

Mr Botha, in a straight contest with Mr Tom Langley of the Conservative Party saw his 1981 majority cut from 3 647 to 621.

After that came the referendum with the Pietersburg region which includes Soutpansberg, recording a "No" vote and the rest of the country overwhelmingly in favour of the constitutional reforms.

Mr Fanie Botha had been the constituency's MP for more than 25 years and had done a great deal for the Northern Transvaal.

He was also the senior cabinet Minister after Mr PW Botha and had a great deal of prestige and political clout.

However, his resignation over his financial affairs and the question of diamond concessions must have disillusioned many Nationalists.

And though Mr Hein Kruger, the MPC who is now the NP's candidate is the province's senior MEC, he does not have the same personal following and political power that Mr Botha had.

Against this is the fact that the CP and HNP are both in the field, and this could divide the Right-wing vote.

There is still an outside chance that the two Right-wing parties will reach an electoral pact. If they don't, the NP may win on a split Right-wing vote.

The Pinetown by-election was caused by the death of the popular ProgFed MP, Mr Harry Pitman.

In the 1981 election, Mr Pitman won the largest PFP majority in the province-- 2 226--in a straight fight against the NP.

However, the PFP MPC, Mr Rodney Haxton, scraped home by 69 votes in a three-way contest with the New Republic Party and the National Party.

Besides this, three other factors make the seat marginal for the PFP.

The first is that the new constitution received huge support in Natal.

This means the PFP has to battle to win back voters who switched their allegiance to the "Yes" camp.

Secondly, the NP has decided not to contest Pinetown. This means that the Nationalist voters will support the NRP (we have no doubt in our minds that the NP decision not to field a candidate was a way of rewarding the NRP for its support in the referendum).

Thirdly, the NRP candidate is Mr Frank Martin, the senior MEC in the province. He commands tremendous political power, having been active in provincial politics for more than 25 years.

If the NRP wins, it will get a new surge of confidence, even though it is still doomed to eventual extinction since it is too closely identified with the NP.

If the PFP loses, it will suffer a further setback to its image and to its position in White politics.

There is another set of possibilities. If the NP wins Soutpansberg and the NRP wins Pinetown, the Prime Minister may call a general election to oust the CP and the PFP from most of the seats these two parties hold.

If, however, the CP wins Soutpansberg and the PFP wins Pinetown, the PM is unlikely to risk a general election.

CSO: 3400/448

ROBERTSON: MPLA MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC WOES

MEMO (SVA) - Foreign Service in English 0500 GMT 5 Jan 84

[Station Commentary: "The MPLA Trouble"]

[Host] Militarily and diplomatically, the MPLA government of Angola is in serious trouble. That seems to be the clear implication of its second approach to the UN Security Council in barely a fortnight. This time it wants the United Nations to adopt what it calls relevant measures to put an end to an escalation of the military situation in Angola. It has also, belatedly, come up with a counter to South Africa's offer of a ceasefire, proposing what amounts to immediate implementation of Resolution 435, while the Cuban troops remain firmly entrenched in Angola.

The two initiatives reflect the extent to which matters have gone awry in the strategy of the MPLA-SWAPO-Soviet axis in recent weeks. To start with, the carefully planned SWAPO terrorist offensive into South-West Africa this year is not turning into the spectacular breakthrough, augmenting the diplomatic successes of the past year, that it was meant to be. The time the offensive has been preceded by a strengthening of MPLA-Cuban bases in the south, and the deployment of Soviet missile systems to deter counteraction from South-West Africa. A new tactic for facilitating the southward movement of the SWAPO terrorist bands was worked out. As soon as security forces made contact with them, they should slip aside at once to the protection of the nearest MPLA base.

But it is not working out that way. The defenses are being overcome. SWAPO is being crushed, and is suffering heavy losses, and its drive towards South-West Africa seems to be disintegrating steadily.

Meanwhile, the MPLA is facing the biggest threat to itself since it came to power. The UNITA movement has intensified its offensive in the civil war and has in recent weeks made advances even in the north of the country. Even in Western governments, which UNITA was discounted as a political and military forces, reassessment are being made of the effects of the latest developments on Angola's future and the South-West African settlement initiative.

In Africa, the MPLA is in danger of becoming estranged from a big bloc of relatively moderate governments as it becomes exposed not only as a regime with virtually no popular support, but as little more than a pawn in a Soviet power

drive in Southern Africa. The diplomatic faux pas of its knee-jerk rejection of South Africa's ceasefire proposal was a damaging setback in countering that erosion of continental support. Hence, the counter offer this week.

That the counter offer was a transparent ruse amounting to a reiteration of its refusal to consider a withdrawal of Cuban troops illustrates the MPLA's dilemma. Clearly, the way out of its troubles is a genuine move to negotiate with the opponents, who have repeatedly offered peace and cooperation through negotiation of differences. Exercising that option, however, would cripple the Soviet Union in its expansionist plans in the region, and the MPLA is beholden to the Kremlin for its very existence.

CSO: 3400/474

NEW WEAKENING SEEN IN SA ECONOMY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 Dec 83 p 20

[Text]

VARIOUS factors have contributed to a renewed weakening of South Africa's economy, despite consensus recently among many businessmen that the worst of the present economic downswing was over and that considerably improved business conditions could be expected in 1984, Sanlam says.

In its latest economic survey, Sanlam isolates the following factors:

- The weaker trend in the gold price which, combined with indications that Government expenditure will rise at a fast rate in the year ahead, makes tax increases in the next Budget almost inevitable.
- A growing awareness that structural changes in the world economy will not cause our exports (especially of base metals) to increase swiftly and sharply this time.

- The most recent figures on the money supply, which emphasise that the authorities are still experiencing serious problems in decreasing the growth in the money supply: a relaxation in monetary policy in the foreseeable future is thus out of the question.

- The weak financial position of the private consumer (While salaries will probably once again rise only moderately in 1984, there is a possibility of tax increases. In addition, personal debt stands at record levels).

"Taking these factors into account, as well as the fact that results of the drought will be felt for an appreciable time to come, it appears that a significant improvement in general business conditions cannot be expected before the third quarter of 1984," Sanlam says.

Regarding inflation, Sanlam says that after a quarter during which the food price index actually fell, October proved to be the third successive month of relatively sharp rises.

In addition to the increase in food prices, the higher costs of housing (largely owing to higher mortgage bond interest rates) contributed in great measure to the October hike of one percent in the total consumer price index.

"We think that this somewhat disappointingly high rate of increase has ensured that the year-on-year rise in the consumer price index will not descend to below the 10 percent level this year. On the contrary, it may even be above 11 percent again by the end of the year.

"We expect an average increase of a shade over 12 percent for 1983 as a whole." — Sapa.

EFFECT OF WATER SHORTAGE ON ECONOMY DISCUSSED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 Dec 83 p 8

[Text] An upswing in the South African economy next year as envisaged by the Minister of Finance, Mr Owen Horwood, might prove impossible because of the current water shortage.

Mr Anton Steyn, an official at the Department of Environment Affairs, told The Citizen although an upswing in the economy has been predicted for next year, this might be impossible for industries on the Reef, Pretoria, the Witwatersrand area and the Natal to run at full capacity due to the current economic situation in the country. As soon as the economy is better, industries will produce at full capacity again.

"Although the agriculture drought has been mainly broken, we are still in for a grim time," Mr Steyn said.

"In spite of the seemingly good rains the country has had, irrigation farmers and industries are still in a drought grip."

Mr Steyn said there was no possibility that water restrictions could be lifted in the near future.

He said there was a possibility that penalty clauses in Natal, the province that had been affected worst by the drought, might be lifted if the good rains which had been falling continued.

But, Mr Steyn said, water restrictions would still be imposed in Natal and a 30 to 50 percent saving of water would still be asked for in Natal.

"Although the flow of the Vaal River is reasonable, we are looking at a possibility of imposing stricter water restrictions in the Pretoria, Johannesburg and Vereeniging area. We will have to wait a while and see what this rainy season will bring," Mr Steyn said.

The state of the Vaal Dam, which supplies most of the Pretoria, Johannesburg and Vereeniging area with domestic water has risen two percent in the past week, but is still seven percent down compared with the same time last year. The state of the Vaal Dam is 40 percent. Midmar Dam in Natal has risen six percent to 39 percent but had been 50 percent this time last year.

The Klipfontein Dam has risen one percent to 41, but the Albert Falls has been constant at six percent since last week.

OSO: 3400/448

SOUTH AFRICA

INTERVIEW WITH COLORED LEADER

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 15 Nov 83 p 10

Interview with Carter Ebrahim, chairman of the Financial and Administrative Committee of the Labor Party, by Otto Krause: "Referendum Undesirable Step for Coloreds;" in Capetown; date of interview not given]

[Text: After the constitutional legislation and the white referendum, the ball is now in the court of the Colored and Indian communities. The manner in which they treat the constitutional process and assess options is going to be of the greatest importance.

Otto Krause talked in Capetown with Mr Carter Ebrahim, the chairman of the Financial and Administrative Committee of the Labor Party, about the next constitutional round.

[Question: How do you see the outcome of the white referendum?

[Ebrahim: Without being euphoric, I see the outcome of the referendum as a statement on the part of the whites that they are prepared to accept a radical reform.

Now there will no longer be any fear on the part of the government that its position is being threatened by either leftist or rightist elements.

As to the colored population as a whole, we must admit that there is division with respect to the constitutional developments.

The privileged, the well-to-do Coloreds, have reservations about the white Yes vote. But the majority of the colored people who live in our sub-economic residential areas will very certainly encourage their leaders to take part in the new system and in parliamentary elections.

Those people want their leaders to be where the laws are made, changed and possibly repealed. For only in parliament are decisions made which can improve their fate. For those people, the needy among the colored population, the outcome of the referendum is encouraging. And they are my people.

[Question] How is this attitude reflected in numbers among the Coloreds?

[Ebrahim] I strongly believe that my feelings and the feelings of the people who agree with me on this point represent the majority of the colored voters' feelings.

[Question] But what is the so-called intellectual position of the Coloreds?

[Ebrahim] Those people are precisely the privileged rank among the Coloreds. They are not affected as much by apartheid; they were always able to buy themselves out of that, as it were. Their thinking represents an ideological mass of earlier, now obsolete, political organizations, and they are not realistic enough to get rid of that. They are not at all practical political people.

In any event, those people never represented an important part of the voters' corps of our Labor Party.

In that so-called intellectual and privileged rank, an element of bitterness can be noticed. That is the social consequence of discrimination.

But those people are largely limited to the Cape Peninsula, and their view is certainly not shared by, for example, the Coloreds in rural areas and Transvaal. Even in the Cape Peninsula they don't have a decisive influence.

On the other hand, they make a lot of noise and therefore they attract attention; but just as in the past, they'll probably break apart again. For in spite of their negative attitude, the real truth is that their interests still lie in accepting the constitutional system and in cooperating with it.

[Question] In which groups is the negative attitude you mentioned the strongest?

[Ebrahim] Schools for example, which has become a hiding place for frustrated politicians--those of the retired old guard. They don't have the courage to practice politics openly, and their attitude only harms the interests of our colored athletes. In that area they have not been able to do anything with respect to international standards. There are also the campus radicals. Their political activities are limited to their few years in school or at the university. It is understandable, for they don't carry any responsibility in society. And after they leave the university and obtain good positions, they turn wise and moderate.

But you must not think that all young Coloreds are negative. Trade students, young artisans, young workers in general are responsible and reality-conscious.

Third, there is a negative element in our churches. This is lamentable because our religious life should not be divided over politics.

[Question] What about the United Democratic Front?

[Ebrahim] They made a lot of noise before the referendum, but the positive message of reform which came from the whites on 2 November caused a setback to the UDF. One should not underestimate the good effect of that result on colored thinking. We see many signs these days that the UDF is ailing.

[Question] What do you think: Should a referendum or election be held among Coloreds to get their opinion on the constitutional system?

[Ebrahim] Both a referendum and an election are opinion tests. Then why go through the process twice? Therefore I feel strongly that we should only have an election of representatives for the new Colored chamber in parliament. That's enough.

The radicals made it very clear that they don't want to have any part in any positive steps whatsoever. They really don't want to test the opinion of the Coloreds; they would rather demonstrate by means of a boycott. Therefore we must do the practical thing and get our new democracy started.

8700

CSO: 3401/29

ARTICLE EXAMINES ALTERNATIVES FOR INDIAN DEVELOPMENT

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 18 Nov 83 p 13

[Article by Anson Akhalwaya: "The Indian's Choices "]

[Text] While Mr Amichand Rajbansi said this week in the meeting addressed by the prime minister in the Durban City Hall that the new constitution must be given a chance, an urgent reason why it must be rejected was dramatized outside.

Over 40 members of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) were taken into custody because they allegedly held an illegal demonstration. Their guilt or otherwise will be decided by a court, so that the matter is sub judice.

However, the fact that law exist and are regularly applied which curb peaceful protests and demonstrations in the open air, makes a lie of the argument that South Africa is a democracy or is on the road to a democracy through reform.

In the hall Mr Botha told the invited Indian audience that they have five constitutional choices. The event outside showed that they have only two: to agree with the government policy or to reject it and be treated like the NIC members were.

In an speech Mr Botha said that nowhere outside of India any Indian community has achieved the constitutional recognition which is now being /offered/ [in boldface] to the South African whites.

That might be true, for as far as I know people of Indian origin who are citizens of their country have never been placed on a separate voters' list and then been told that they were given full rights, while the majority of the local population were called foreigners.

The situation and history of people of Indian origin in the country is unique, of course. Two things must be kept in mind: that the largest settlement of Indians abroad, apart from South Africa, is in the United Kingdom where black immigrants are on the common voters' list and can be elected to any public office.

People of Indian origin have become government officials in high positions elsewhere--Morocco and the Caribbean islands are examples--and in the case of Mauritius they have even been the head of the government.

If Mr Botha is being understood correctly, his view is yet another reason why the new system should be rejected. The key words he used are "offered recognition." In other words, Indians and other groups specified by the government don't get the opportunity to negotiate on an acceptable constitution, but are /offered/ what the whites have decided they should get.

If anyone had doubts as to whether Coloreds and Indians were being offered co-optation as junior partners, Mr Botha's view has removed those. That's with respect to the "hidden clauses" which some whites tried to make us believe would be announced after 2 November.

The first one, as on the prime minister's list of choices for Indians, is that they "accept" the new constitution, through which they will remain in control of their own affairs and have part responsibility in common matters. In my view, such a choice is only acceptable if one accepts the absurd and humiliating classification of the Population Register. You cannot decide your own matters without being classified by race. And how can matters which are "common" with respect to whites, Coloreds and Indians suddenly be "not common" for blacks?

The second choice is to "put up with the new constitutional system for the sake of expediency and hence to destroy it." That is not a choice, of course. "The destruction from within" tactic which was used by the Labor Party in the Representative Colored Council only had a limited value.

Thus back to the drawing board, where whites effectively decide on a new system. This is why the ratio 4,2,1 is written into the new constitution--to entrench and protect effective control by whites.

The third choice is to reject this "in favor of the status quo." That means that if one doesn't accept what the whites have offered, it does not matter. But that same unreasonableness was applied with respect to the white referendum when those who said "no" because the change didn't go far enough were accused of being hand in glove with those who thought it went too far.

The fourth choice is to reject the system in favor of one in which Indians can be included in a black nation.

A "black nation" is one prescribed by the government, which also sets the borders of a "national territory." That means a tribal-ethnic policy while we want to be part of a South African nation. This choice would readily be acceptable on two conditions: first, that a "black nation" comprises all the inhabitants of this country, just like a "white nation" is comprised of such deviating groups as Afrikaners, English-speaking, Jews, Portuguese, Netherlanders, Germans, etc.; and, second, that such a black nation is given the area it inhabits, from the Cape to Limpopo.

The fifth option is to reject the new system in favor of radicalism. "Radicalism," said the prime minister, will lead to "conflict, bloodshed and violence."

By whom?

From press reports it is difficult to determine whether Mr Botha continued and gave his interpretation of "radical." From past National Party speeches it appears

that "radical" does not apply only to the policy of a violent overthrow of the government, but also to the system which advocates one person, one vote, even the way it is formulated in the weak PFP [Progressive Federal Party] policy of a minority veto.

If that is the case, South Africa must be the only country in which a demand for the most fundamental political right--equal voting rights--is considered "radical."

The true choice is thus only to accept or reject the whites' offer.

Rejection means voluntarily not to have anything to do with an unacceptable system, but to continue to strive through any peaceful means for what is a basic demand.

By voting in that manner, most of us moderates will be branded "radical," and we will face the consequences of such "radicalism," as did the demonstrators in Durban--and thousands of our compatriots previously.

8700

CSO: 3401/29

BRIEFS

CP, HNP ELECTION DISAGREEMENT--After talks in Pretoria with the Herstigte Nasionale Party [HNP], the leader of the Conservative Party [CP], Dr Andries Treurnicht, has said that he stands by an earlier statement issued by Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg. The talks failed, and each party will now name candidates for both the parliamentary and the provincial seats on nomination day next Wednesday. This will lead to a three-way contest with the National Party. Earlier, Dr Hartzenberg said that the talks had taken place in a good spirit, but that no agreement on a pact in the election had been reached. In his reaction, the leader of the HNP, Mr Jaap Marais, expressed his disappointment that no progress had been made on a pact in the byelection. Mr Marais added that the HNP would now have a full go in the Soutpansberg byelections. In a joint statement issued after the talks in Pretoria, the two delegations said the issue of cooperation between the two parties would again be reconsidered at a later stage. [Text] [MB060901 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 6 Jan 84]

CSO: 3400/475

NYERERE DISCLOSES FOREIGN AID, PROGRESS OF UJAMAA

London AFRICA NOW in English Dec 83 pp 98, 101, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 113, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125

[President Julius Nyerere interview with Peter Enahoro at Nyerere's residence in Masini Bay, Dar es Salaam; date not given]

[Excerpts]

[] Mr President, when I interviewed you on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Tanzania's independence in 1972, I asked you what you thought had been Tanzania's greatest achievement. You replied — and I'm quoting the exact words — "That we have survived." We are now in 1983 and Tanzania is about to celebrate another anniversary. What would Your Excellency now describe as your greatest achievement during these years?

[] I think I would still give the same answer that we have survived. We did extremely well in our first years and although I merely said we had survived we should not forget that when African countries were achieving their independence, even the very idea of their surviving was in question. But during the last 10 years we have gone through immense difficulties, especially economically. That is why I say we can still say, "Well, we have survived the last 10 years." I think our greatest achievement is still the fact that we have consolidated ourselves as a nation. We did not necessarily set out to be a nation; originally I thought we were going to become part of a nation, but we have consolidated ourselves as a nation.

[] That is something that can be said about 50 other African countries, so what is so special about merely surviving as a nation?

[] I am not saying we are special — why should we be special? We started out as one of the most backward countries in Africa. Today, in spite of everything, we are among the countries that have the highest literacy rate. Like many African countries, we started with a very small base of education. Today, although all our children do not go to school, we have places in school for every child.

[] You have never thought of making education compulsory?

Education is more or less compulsory. We have not punished some parents who did not send their children to school but we continue to urge them to do so. Its compulsoriness has not been strictly enforced, but education is compulsory. Once we reached a position where we had places for every child in school we decided to make it compulsory.

[] How far are you on the road to the socialist goals you envisage for Tanzania and how much self-reliance has Tanzania achieved since the Arusha Declaration?

First, how far have we come? I do not know how far we have come to becoming socialists. We have defined our goals. I believe that basically our people have accepted the concept. I think the party and the party leadership has accepted our goals of socialism. We have built the institutions for a socialist state. We took some actions which were necessary immediately to turn what elements of capitalism we had into elements of socialism.

But the building of socialism is not a matter of decree. You do not decree socialism, you build socialism. The building of socialism anywhere is a process and in particular that is so in a backward country like Tanzania. You cannot simply say, "You were a capitalist yesterday, today you are a socialist." When you decide to build socialism starting with a peasant economy, you are really beginning a long process. And we are in that process.

How self-reliant are we? We are more self-reliant now than we were 10 years back or when we published the Arusha Declaration. One may now say we could have been more self-reliant had we done x, y, z. There are always "could-have-been's

sos" in history, but we certainly are more self-reliant now than we were 10 years ago. Our institutions rely more on Tanzanians manning them today than before. Our policies are our own policies and people know that our own policies are good policies; economically we depend upon ourselves. Everybody in the world knows we have no "uncle." We rely upon ourselves. We have many friends, but basically we stand on our own feet and if our friends do help us it is basically because they do accept our policies.

The goal of socialism as I understand it is still distant but for a poor country, yes, you can say we are self-reliant although we still have a long way to go.

☐ **Talking of friends, Mr President, people abroad do point out that Tanzania talks about self-reliance, yet Tanzania receives the highest aid from abroad. And so people remark: "Yes, it's all very well to say they are self-reliant, but look at how they have managed to corner a lot of aid coming into Tanzania."**

It is true; but as I say, we have many friends and, basically, these friends are the smaller countries, in particular the Scandinavian countries, Canada and also the Netherlands — and China, of course. The big powers are not particularly interested in our development, not to the same extent.

But when we said we were going to become self-reliant we did not necessarily say we were going to reject any aid. We said we would build our own country ourselves and it happened that these countries liked the policies we announced. They wanted to help us in achieving our objectives and we were very pleased and, quite frankly, when sometimes I point out the successes of our last 10-15 years, a lot of credit also goes to our friends.

But we use the help and we can point to the results of that help. We could not have achieved the degree of the spread of education in the country without this help. It is tremendous . . . tremendous assistance. Take the social services we have been able to build for our people, it would not have been possible for us to achieve all that much without the assistance we got from our friends. It would have been ridiculous for me to say: "Look, you want to help us, but we want to stand on our own feet." But they were really helping us to stand on our own feet.

☐ **I do not have the figures, but it has been said that more people proportionately have moved from rural into urban areas in Tanzania than have done so in the neighbouring countries. This is in spite of the rural development programmes and the emphasis on the conditions of the peasants. Why is this?**

Firstly, I really do not know whether what you say is true. I mean, it is just possible that it is true, I do not have the figures either. It would have been good to have them but our population now is about 20 million. Our urban population is probably two million and the rural population 18m. That means 80% of the population is rural and 20% is urban. Whether that is higher than my neighbours have, I do not know. What is true is that during the past 20 years our urban population has grown. It has increased with natural growth, with migration growth, too, to the extent that we now have industries based in the urban areas and, whatever you do, you cannot stop the attraction of urban areas.

But I believe Tanzania's achievement is actually the opposite of the allegation. The bulk of the population of Tanzania is in the villages. Our people are anchored there in spite of the development in the urban areas. Certainly Dar es Salaam has grown a great deal — we have more than one million people in Dar es Salaam now. But the bulk of the people have stayed in the country and this includes the young.

The last five years have been extremely bad for us economically, yet we have made tremendous progress in changing the rural areas. Yes, people have moved into the urban areas; yes, movement during the last decade must have been bigger than before because the towns are attracting our people a little bit more than previously, but our people have remained anchored in the villages and the reason is mainly the success of our policies.

☐ **One of the things that is often said in your favour is your simplicity, the way in which you do not surround yourself with too much protocol. I want to link this with another question: Do you have an aversion to wealth? If somebody is successful and acquires wealth do you have a natural aversion to him?**

You mean if I see some rich person, do I feel that I am looking upon a leper? No, I don't think I react to them that way. But I am telling you, I am basically a peasant, and now it happens that I am a socialist. Nobody can be rich through his own work. It is not possible.

☐ **There is reward . . .**

Nobody can be rich through his own work — nobody. No millionaire is a millionaire through his own work. He has exploited others, it is not possible to be a millionaire through your own work. Every millionaire — and millionaires can be saints — has amassed his wealth through exploitation.

Just take one of these people who brag: "This is my work" and give him an island for himself and see if he can become rich. People become rich through exploiting others — always.

And why do they want to exploit others? Because what they really want is power. Now this was never intended to be the use of wealth. Wealth is intended to feed you, to give you clothing, to give you shelter, to give you good health, to give you a good education. It was never intended to give power to one person over another. But what do you want to be a millionaire for, if all you want is food and clothing and shelter?

Wealth is not being used for the abolition of poverty, it is being used for the imposition of poverty, which is completely wrong. So I say I have no aversion to a rich man because as far as I know some rich people could be very saintly, could be very good people.

But for myself, I do not need wealth. What do I need wealth for? I have survived for 61 years, I do not know how many more years I still have to go, but I came to this world naked, I shall go back naked, I do not see why I should be so worried about wealth. I want an opportunity to work and I have this opportunity, this immense opportunity to work. I am working for my people, what do I want wealth for? In any case I cannot make myself rich, without exploiting others and I couldn't do that.

□ Mr President, I have been told again and again that Your Excellency is a frequent churchgoer. How do you reconcile this, first, with what I said earlier, your radical image in a world where radicalism seems to look askance at organised worship, even to the concept of God? Secondly, how do you reconcile it with the criticisms, often heard these days, that Christianity, being an imported religion, does not accord with what somebody has described as the "African authenticity"?

I do go to church. I happen to be a believing Catholic. A long time ago I could not have said: "I am a Christian and therefore I cannot lead a liberation movement for our people." It would have been an insult to Christianity. Christianity developed during the Roman empire and it was accused of radicalism. Actually, the first Christians were accused of communism. It is incredible.

Nothing today conflicts with my religion; privately, I find it a help. The idea of incompatibility with African authenticity has never entered my mind. It is true that there are elements of Christianity which were European paganism, thus imported European paganism, European customs to Africa. Sometimes they pretend that it is Christianity. To that extent you simply say, this particular issue is a European custom, why this custom and not our own custom? This debate is going on all the time, but it is neither here nor there.

To some extent I am a conservative. I have been used to some things which I identify with Christianity and I do not question them. But it does not affect my religion at all.

□ You do not think that there is any validity in the claim that there is something culturally — perhaps racially — embarrassing for the African, in that not one single big religion of the two that dominate this continent — Christianity and the Moslem faith — originated from Black Africa?

People who want to debate it with God can call and debate it with Him. I am a Christian, I cannot have a political discussion with God and say: "Why not Africa?" God might say: "What do you mean by: 'Why not Africa?' I have told you: 'I have called Jesus out of Africa.' First he fled into Egypt and it was from Egypt that He came back and began His mission." God might answer that way, so really what is the problem?

There is also a story, although I do not know whether it is authentic or not, that the Prophet Mohamed ran into trouble and went to Ethiopia — possibly not the Ethiopia we know today but an Ethiopia in Africa. Christianity and Islam have had a tremendous influence on the world, but every major influence does not have to originate in Africa.

□ I wish to move to an entirely new area. Was it really necessary for Tanzania to become a one-party state?

What do you mean "really necessary"? One could answer perhaps "no." What is necessary? Perhaps no. But had we not become a one-party state, we would have gone through a period of at least 10 years of strife which would have been ridiculous. And that explains why. Yet I am no believer in a one-party system as a philosophy. You can have two parties, you can have three. But we went through a rather stupid period. We were under British domination and naturally we acquired this idea — not inherited it — of a multi-party system.

We had our party and at first the British did not take us seriously. When they saw how serious we were they supported some Other party, the UTP (United Tanganyika Party) and another one was started and, in the course of the struggle, we had another one which broke away from another one. So we had some five parties by the time we were reaching the peak of the independence struggle. One or two were eliminated, I think, before independence, but after independence I think we still had Congress, we still had the UTP.

So there we were: because we had those parties the thinking was of a multi-party system. But, in reality, there was no multi-party system at all — the reality was the dominance of TANU. When we had elections most of our candidates were returned unopposed. So there were virtually no elections at all. We had a genuine election only once, when Parliament, the National Assembly, had 71 members, most TANU candidates were returned unopposed, those few opposed by people from other parties were easily elected.

The one exception was a candidate challenged by another member of TANU because he did not accept the official candidate. Incidentally, he successfully challenged the official candidate and won. So the only constituency where there was some exercise in democracy was this constituency where the official party candidate was challenged by another member of the party.

Apart from that, in Parliament itself, debate was very difficult. Why? We had a Whip but who was he Whipping? Because we were all of the same party they had to support the government. The whole thing was ridiculous, the process of election was ridiculous, the process of debate was ridiculous, and the organisation of Parliament was ridiculous. That was the situation.

Now we could have said: "Okay, let us continue like this, the other parties will grow, eventually we will have serious parties to contend with."

We could have thought that way but it was unnatural for a nationalist movement which had won. If we want elections, why can't we have proper elections? The man who had defeated the official candidate proved that under our circumstances this was the way to have genuine elections; that is, to have party members in a face-down with each other. So we changed the constitution. This change was demanded not by philosophy but by reality.

So when you ask if it were necessary, I do not know the meaning of "necessary." You may say it was not necessary philosophically, but, in practice, we might have gone through two elections or three elections which would have been completely meaningless, without another party.

Today, it is just possible, in spite of the dominant position of the CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi), that if we were to change the law you would have more parties, I do not know; but I do know that at the time we changed the Constitution, although it was not philosophically necessary, it looked to us that it was necessary, for reasons of practicality, to organise a system of election, of democracy and debate, which accepted the reality as it then was.

Yes, but over a period, those who may have opted out at that time because of their losses or the fear of losing may have reconstituted themselves by now.

Yes, and that is what I am saying: that we could have said: "Okay, let us go through this farce for another two terms of elections and then these parties will become stronger."

Your decision at that time has bequeathed the legacy of a question that one still asks today and it is this, Mr President: Does not the one-party system contradict fundamental rights because it is the law that prevents any other party coming into being?

Yes, and I am saying the law was a consequence of the reality which was not law at that time. The parties did not die because of the law; the parties were not there. The law was simply to enable our people to participate in elections and to make debate more realistic. Actually, that is how we began to throw up a large number of senior government officials, party members, government Ministers. I mean for us it was the most democratic thing to do. If in future Tanzanians want to do something different they can do it. Really, I am not philosophically opposed to a multi-party system. But at that time the whole thing looked ridiculous; it was TANU versus non-existent parties.

☐ The question I must ask is where does Tanzania go from here? I mean here we have a system which obviously has these weaknesses as far as human rights are concerned . . .

What do you mean? You mean party rights not human rights. You mean party rights because as far as human rights are concerned, every person in Tanzania . . .

We are not an elite party. The CCM contains elements running virtually through the whole spectrum of any political views you may care to name. This is a party in a small country yet it has more than two million members. It can be argued that we should split it up so that each faction would have its own party. But, human rights . . . how many parties do you have to have in order to have human rights?

☐ It is quantitative . . .

It is quantitative because peoples insist on quantifying it. A party is an organisation to enable people to participate freely in the political affairs of their own country. This idea that there have to be two parties cannot be philosophical; it has to be demanded by the people themselves. The rights of a citizen are not the rights of a non-existent group, they are the rights of the individual citizen. Our people were not participating, they were not voting, because of this theoretical nonsense of sticking to a multi-party system. So here was this nonsense, how were we safeguarding the political rights of our people? By getting everybody returned unopposed?

If, as some say, the more parties you have the more democratic you are, then Italy is much more democratic than Britain; but sometimes the results of their elections can be very peculiar.

☐ I, too, was thinking of the individual. I have as a journalist taken many stands where I expressed by opinions freely under another system. I do not claim that what I said was necessarily right, but I think I can say that I believe I represented at least a strong minority view. If expressing our views did not lead to our having our way, at least we had had our say.

Now, under the system here, a consequence of the one-party system is that there is a monopoly of the media, by either the party or the government. I am asking, therefore, if I were a Tanzanian journalist, what opportunity would there have been for me as an individual, a concerned individual who does not want to overthrow the system but frequently, even at all times, wants to be free to express his views without fear of the consequences of being thrown out?

There is a practical problem here for the individual who is constantly questioning and not only questioning, but wants to mobilise opinion and support in his favour, because he has genuine beliefs. That is why I mention the question of human rights, because there is an issue here of the fundamental rights of that individual to express himself freely and to be given full opportunity to seek support from others for his point of view.

If a country to be democratic has to have a multi-party system, I am simply asking the question: the United States is a democracy but has it the vigour of a democracy? If you analyse this great democracy, you will find there are people there who claim that the country is dominated by two parties and that they have no say, that they cannot be heard, because the two parties dominate the system. They have the money and, if you do not have money, your voice is not heard. So you will find lots of people, perhaps millions, who say: "What do we do?"

So in every country you will find people asking: "How do we express ourselves, especially if we cannot have our way?" But I am saying it is not simply their way they cannot have; sometimes they do not have their say. They can speak to their wives at home, but if they want to speak to the public, how do they get through to the media, since the media are also completely dominated by the two parties?

So what I am saying is that, everywhere you go, you will find that this is a question of degree. We had the party elections in October (1982). The very critics of our system were hoping that the right-wingers in our party would take over. They did not take over, they were completely annihilated. But the very people who are critical of our system which they say is not a free system were expecting the right-wingers to take over the system. And they could have taken over, because we are a huge party with many tendencies.

Some people think I am too socialist, others that I am not socialist enough. We are a mass party but because we are one-party we cannot ask you to form your own party for the sake of expressing your views, it would be wrong. We cannot ask you to break the law, but we cannot prevent

From what?

From speaking out in the party

It is very difficult. Why must I be compelled to stay within that party when my inclinations are and my desire is to stay outside it?

Is your inclination to say it outside the party or to say it at all? Is it to say it or merely to say it elsewhere? Because what you are saying is you want to have your say.

I want to have my say to start with. Then I want to have the opportunity to organise people freely to that point of view.

Organise them within the party! They are there, they are available, they are organisable, they are being organised all the time by individuals like you. They will influence the party. It is completely open to you to go in with your views.

One is often afraid of what happens to people, say in the rural areas, who are not under the direct scrutiny and protection of people at the top. Wrongdoings may not happen at the top but back there where there is a party man who probably is a bit of a roughneck . . .

And your idea is that such a party man is so committed . . . This is your idea: you go and see this party man of whom you are so afraid. The party man of whom you are so afraid is a person who is probably expressing your views. Those party men you have in the country, you think these are diehard socialists.

Anyway, look, my own education is very Western, so I understand what you are saying, but I would say that people here are very free.

Talking about personal freedoms under the one-party system, I think I need to make myself clear. What I am trying to put across is that for me political beliefs are like religious beliefs; they are fundamental and if one genuinely believes in a political ideology it is innate in him. So, when you have a one-party system, and that one party already declares itself socialist, for instance, it means that in order to join it you have willy-nilly to be a socialist. But suppose your natural inclination is not that way, then to me it is like saying: "This state is Moslem and you must be Moslem," when, in fact, your inclination is towards Christianity.

Say, for another example, that we are talking about the Christian Church: one man says: "I'm Catholic," but here is a state that says it is Protestant and you have to be Protestant. How can I be told then that I am able to exercise my personal freedom of choice in that situation?

I do not know what more I can say. I do not believe that the question of one party or two parties, or three parties is on the same level as one religion, two religions or three religions. A one-religion country or two-religion country is a matter of philosophy, — a matter of metaphysics. It is not a matter of political convenience. I do not put the party organisation on the same philosophical level, as I have tried to explain. Parties are organised mainly out of practical needs, not philosophically. Because philosophically, how many parties do you have to have?

Let me put it in this way: politically you want to achieve something, you organise yourselves and you set up the kind of organisation which will enable you to achieve your goal. I did explain that we chose a one-party system, not out of a philosophical belief, but because it was made necessary by the situation in Tanzania. Quite frankly, if the situation had been different, I do not know what would have happened. We became legally a one-party state because we were a one-party state but without the legislation.

If you ask me today what has the one-party achieved, which otherwise would have been achieved by the two-party system, then I say, first of all, it enabled us to have democratic elections whereas we would not have had democratic elections had we insisted on a two-party system, because that was the experience before we adopted a one-party system. We have been able to achieve a degree of unity which we may not have achieved without the one-party system.

What about today? Apart from national unity, we have been able to avoid tribal and religious divisions. When you are not really ideologically developed, you tend to form parties on the basis of tribalism — we were able to avoid that.

What about today? You did ask me about the Arusha Declaration. Frankly, I believe that, had ours been a multi-party system, we would still be groping about for a national policy. I think we have been able to be firm, to be very clear, about what this nation is about and as a result we have a national purpose. I believe we have this national purpose now because we have only one party.

Again, I am refusing to put this on a philosophical level, I am putting it on the practical level, because while I am not philosophically opposed to a multi-party system, neither am I an advocate of a single party system, not for philosophical reasons, but out of practical need.

Some of your critics abroad point out that Tanzania operates a Preventive Detention Act and that there are consequently political detainees in Tanzania. The question I would like to put is this: If somebody has committed a

crime, it may be that in the short term it is not possible to prosecute him because the evidence is being assembled; but after a year — after two years — if he cannot be brought to trial, something is wrong if he continues to be detained. So why does this system operate?

I know my critics always bring up this question of preventive detention. I did not invent the Preventive Detention Act; various countries have them. The question is how do you use the law? All states have the power to detain without trial, it depends upon the circumstances. The British detain without trial in time of war or whatever they regard as an emergency situation. Usually the law is intended to detain people who are regarded as constituting a danger to the security of the state. Therefore, usually, these are political people.

So, since there is this law and we use it, there is the assumption that I have many political detainees — some people have put it at thousands. Actually, it is not true. If we calculated all the political people — true political detainees that we have detained under the Act since independence — you might get a few hundreds. At some given periods we have had no detainees at all. At the moment those you might call political detainees are the ones who allegedly tried to overthrow the state at the beginning of this year.

But it is believed in some quarters that there are others. I have often said this publicly but they refuse to pick it up: You gauge a country by the people who politically run away from that country. Sometimes I have been forced to use the political Detention Act to block off some economic saboteurs, for instance. This law was never intended to do that, but sometimes you have these fellows, we know they are saboteurs and they are causing a lot of trouble. I cannot just leave them as if they are not causing any trouble. So

sometimes I have used the law, to put cattle-rustlers inside.

So the real criticism which could be directed at me is the use of the law not really for state security in the way it was intended, but sometimes to supplement the ordinary law. But my critics, instead of directing criticism where it really belongs, say I have a lot of political detainees in the country, which is not true. Now, for instance, these people accused of plotting — I do not know how much I am allowed to say about them — but why have the police been so slow in getting them prosecuted? I suppose they have their genuine reasons but in the meantime they are there. And there are adequate allegations that they did try to overthrow the state, so what should we do with them? Am I supposed to let them roam about the country? You can say: "Well, by now they should have been prosecuted," and you may be right.

One thing which people fear is that when you have a law that is occasionally applied to supplement ordinary law, where the law is considered inadequate, it creates a chain-reaction and perhaps that fact is reflected in the recent incident where the state felt that the need had come to clamp down on those described as economic saboteurs. A law was retroactively applied in order to be able to deal with that situation. This is the kind of syndrome that troubles people because once you start on a course like detention without trial it begins to go into other things. How can one defend the act of making something illegal in order to punish people who at the time of the event did not break any law? For instance, these people found having money at home, they might have had money for various reasons, but they did not know at the time that they were breaking the law because there was no existing law forbidding them to do so.

Yes, it is true and this is of course our real dilemma, and if you want to be a real good critic, you start here. But you can see how popular the action was. Actually, we are becoming slightly unpopular now because it is felt we are dealing with them a little bit too leniently. I released one of them after three months in detention and I had to answer publicly why I had released the fellow. What they were doing may not have been illegal, but they were certainly outrageous. They were completely outrageous, so we had to do something. We had to act. One way I could have acted was to use the Detention Act, which I did. I said: "If you cannot use the ordinary law — and obviously the last 20 years have shown that you cannot use the ordinary law to curb this — I am going to stick my neck out and use detention." And I did.

Of course, the lawyers and the others said: "Well, we could have . . . why not legislation?" I said "Okay, we shall have legislation" and we went to Parliament. Actually, the law that we ourselves proposed was virtually rejected by Members of Parliament; they made it tougher.

What could we have done? Say: "Okay, we have now passed legislation, from now on behave yourselves?" These people were engaged in the sabotage of the economy. They are crooks. And the thing was outrageous and the government cannot simply fold its hands like this and do nothing.

There is something worrying, Mr President, in that our security agencies in Africa — not just Tanzania — are inadequate. I honestly do not think one can trust their expertise in the sense that, while you, Mr President, may be acting perfectly straightforwardly, are you satisfied that you are receiving the correct advice? What about victimisation?

Oh, I do agree with you. A law like that may be misused. And of course the people too are complaining about the possibility of misuse. This will happen. These laws, these powers can be misused. But we have been in a situation where the law itself was being used by criminals and the law then looks ridiculous to the public. When these saboteurs were just moving around as if there was no law and sometimes they were taken to court and clever lawyers defended them and they got away with it, they were ridiculing authority, they were ridiculing the law and it was no use my saying: "What can I do?" I cannot say: "What can I do?" when really these saboteurs are so clearly defying the law. They get away with some things by using technical loopholes in the law. But we know they are crooks. You try to prosecute them and they get away with it. So there is the problem.

This applies to all cases coming to court where lawyers are allowed to appear, Mr President.

The law is intended to stop crime. And so what do you do? I cannot say I cannot do anything since I have these powers. I will act where the law appears to be inadequate. It may provoke some people and if they say: "Mwalimu, why do you do this?" I will say: "I am dealing with crooks. If you have a better way of dealing with these crooks, well deal with them." We are doing it and it is legal; the judges are in charge; the tribunals are led by professional judges. We have got to protect the citizens through the use of this collective power we have.

How would you describe the success of the ujamaa scheme on which hangs a lot of Tanzania's reputation abroad?

How can I describe it? I did say, when you phrased your question differently, that the building of socialism is a process, and we are developing this country to be a socialist state. I said all development whether capitalist or socialist is a process. So the processes take place and when you ask how do I describe its success I say we are building socialism in the country and our people are engaged in the villages, they are in various stages of building socialist villages.

Has not Ujamaa failed? That is what I am really asking.

Yes, I know: my critics would say it has failed. We have not failed. I mean, what is failure? We are building a socialist state and the fact that I have a severe balance of payments problem — so what? People jump to the conclusion that it is because we have socialist policies. In that case Reagan's capitalist policies have failed and that is why they have their own economic mess. Margaret Thatcher's have failed and that is why they have nearly 3.5m unemployed in spite of the gold and the oil and the inheritance of the empire.

We are going through difficulties but to say we have failed is wishful thinking by our enemies. But I should not be saying these things publicly. I think I should let my enemies think we are failing.

They will leave you alone then?
They will leave me alone.

Mr President, as a non-economist there is one argument that I have always found valid and that is that socialism is unable to sustain incentive for the individual. If you add this to the realities of a developing country, where the mentality is that government work is something you can delay, how do you combat this?

How do you provide incentive in a developing socialist society so that people do not think: "The work belongs to everyone, it does not belong to me?" Is not the case for socialism, therefore, weak when confronted by the other system — maybe not by outright capitalism, but by a liberal form of it, which says you must permit the individual his own little possessions and give him opportunity to develop his full potential; that while the kind of society you are talking about is good idealistic talk, in practice it is not working.

Let me admit there is truth — how much truth I do not know — in what I say. But it depends upon one's objective in life. It is true, capitalism is extremely dynamic and one reason why it is so dynamic is because it is very ruthless and that ruthlessness feeds on selfishness. Capitalism will throw people onto the streets. I know it is being tempered now, but then this is the 20th century and, therefore, now you have the welfare state. By its very nature, capitalism, as I said, is extremely ruthless and therefore to the entrepreneur, this fellow who wants the freedom to exploit, the incentive is tremendous. Give him labour and he will push; unlike the manager of a parastatal organisation, the fellow will push; there is no doubt about this. He has a dynamism which you cannot find in the manager of a parastatal organisation. So I accept that this is true.

But capitalism harbours poverty, capitalism breeds poverty, there is no doubt about it. It is not true that socialism breeds poverty. Because it does not breed poverty it does not save; because it is not ruthless it does not save and therefore it is not the dynamic system that capitalism is. We could have said let us first of all accept the dynamism of capitalism; let us be metaphorically believing socialists but let us not try to build socialism now; let capitalism take over and let this dynamism of capitalism build the country before we begin to build socialism. This we ruled out.

I have had to debar the leadership from untrammelled amassing of wealth, so to that extent you are removing incentive, but that is not the same as removing incentives for

the people of Tanzania because the people of Tanzania are as free as anybody in working for themselves.

The incentive to exploit others is very different from the incentive to develop yourself within the limits of a fair society, so you have to decide. I repeat, I believe it is true here in Tanzania that the capitalist manager works for longer hours than the manager of my parastatal organisation. He is less wasteful than the manager of my parastatal organisation; in that sense he is more efficient.

But it depends upon what you want to do. We want to build a society of equals. We will build a society, a civilised society, given time. We are going to build a completely civilised society of civilised people, reasonably equal; have services available to everybody, good transport available to everybody. This nonsense of everybody having his own private car is rubbish. The Americans will one day discover that everybody is not going to have his own private car. This is ambitious. We will abolish poverty, we will abolish both forms of poverty and only socialism can do it, capitalism cannot do it. We will abolish absolute poverty — and if you want proof, go around; we are still very poor, but we are abolishing absolute poverty.

Are you not asking too much of one generation?

We will abolish relative poverty. This thing I was talking about, the creation of millionnaires in the midst of poverty, what for? Simply for the domination of others. We will abolish poverty. Capitalism can abolish absolute poverty, although sometimes poverty is needed by capitalism. For instance, unemployment in Britain is necessary for capitalism. Capitalism can produce enough wealth to abolish actual poverty, what it cannot do is to abolish relative poverty — never. It will always be a class society.

You ask if I am asking too much of this generation; what is asking too much? We all started poor. I do not know about Nigeria, but here when we took over we all were poor, all of us. And then, because some of us took up jobs and so on and so forth, we became slightly different from the others. Our position became quite nice and very different from the positions of the mass of the people. So when the party says: "Look, stop there; do not amass wealth, that is not what you are here for," is that asking too much of our own people?

If you look at the films from the United States and you say to yourself admiringly: "Look how they live in the United States!" then I say pack up and go to the United States and live like they live. Here, you should look at the village in Tanzania; do not always look at the two cars and the fridges and all those things in the capitalist countries, in the exploiting countries. They

exploited people when we were still colonised, they are still exploiting us now. You would not look at them and say that is what we want to be. Apart from being immoral, it is ridiculous.

My conversation by saying that Your Excellency was one of the very, very few African leaders who took a stand about the dictatorship and the horrible things that were going on, although to be frank, in Zanzibar, at the time of Karume we had people disappearing. Recently, we have had reports that Diallo Telli, the first secretary-general of the OAU, was put to a gruesome death.

People look up to you, Mr President, as one of the very few Africans who should occasionally express what I call the African conscience — not of course to highlight Tanzania's moral conscience and offend everybody — but on given occasions like this, to come out and denounce what you see to be happening, because there is a growing cynicism in Africa that nothing can be changed. People feel helpless and they need a lead when it concerns cruelty by Africans.

Why do we stick to protocol when it concerns us? When Steve Biko was put to death in South Africa there was quite rightly an outcry, but when it happens in an independent African state, we do not have the same leadership morally. There is a silence which troubles everybody.

I suppose there are two explanations for it. One is this exaggerated respect for sovereignty and I have questioned it myself in the past. What is this nonsense? The Europeans, for example, respect sovereignty amongst themselves, but from time to time they point a finger at some state and say: "You cannot join us, you are a fascist," or that sort of thing. They have standards they would like to see the European Community maintaining and they can speak out, couched diplomatically yes, but they speak out.

In Africa we can still respect the sovereignty of a country without justifying its policies or simply being silent. Instead, there is an exaggerated respect for sovereignty and I think we are wrong and we use the OAU Charter as an excuse. We are wrong, all of us. I believe we are wrong and I emphasise *all* of us, including myself, we are all wrong. We should be able to talk more openly about human rights within our own territories. We have been treating the OAU as a trade union of the leadership.

The other point is — and again we are all affected — who will cast the first stone? We look at ourselves and, to be honest, we say: "I am not going to be the first one to cast the first stone." This is an explanation, it is not an excuse. Whatever the reasons — and I have had my share of it in this country — we are all tainted by this.

But perhaps things are changing. We have accepted a human rights commission and this commission is supposed to issue a report. I hope now, on the basis of the human rights commission report that is supposed to be made to the organisation, the OAU can begin to ask what is happening, even in Tanzania; that the commissioners, whoever they may be, will begin to apply some pressure on all of us.

— Mr President, for the record, why did you permit Tanzanian troops to cross into Uganda at the time of the incident with Idi Amin? One of the comments that is frequently made these days is that it should have been enough for Tanzania to chase Idi Amin's troops out of Tanzania and let the Ugandans deal with him themselves.

What is "enough"? His people had invaded our country and it is true that once we had chased them out of Tanzania, we might have said: "We'll leave it there." I do not believe that that would have been adequate punishment. I really think we had to punish them inside Uganda. It would have been militarily absurd to say no Tanzanian soldier should cross that border. Why did we continue beyond simply going in and punishing those people inside? We never set out to remove Amin; frankly, we never did. A lot of pressure was put on me to stop once we had gone in and inflicted some punishment on Amin. Amin had invaded my country, but it was a different matter when some of my colleagues in the OAU simply said: "Stop!" I said: First, you have to condemn Amin. At least put it on the record that you condemn his act of aggression. Do not equate Tanzania with Uganda by simply saying: "You people, stop fighting!" Condemn the aggression and then ask: "Tanzania, how far do you intend to go?" I was personally quite irritated about the business of equating us with Amin. So that was another matter.

The third point illustrates one of those developments which unexpectedly come out of a situation like that. Baganda is the province which borders on Tanzania. The people there had suffered under Amin. Our troops moved very quickly through southern Baganda and they were received with tremendous jubilation. Amin announced: "You people are receiving the Tanzanians with jubilation, you wait until they get out." So when these pressures were being put on me, I kept saying: "Look, one thing you can believe of Amin. It is that when he threatens to teach the Buganda a lesson, he will do it, so who is going to protect them?"

As far as I was concerned we could have pulled our people out, but the Baganda were going to be in real trouble because Amin, if he were left with adequate forces, would really teach them a lesson, and I would begin having thousands of refugees

in Tanzania. I kept saying that, until those people were strong enough to look after themselves, we would carry on.

Meanwhile there was still no condemnation of Amin and that eventually led us to say he must go. If he were allowed to stay and he were not being condemned, he would wriggle out and start all over again and the people of Tanzania would be very angry with me if the next invasion became much more serious.

☐ Since the fall of Amin, his immediate successors, Lule and Binaisa, accused you of masterminding their fall. What is your own version of the events?

My version? What shall I say? Lule was a fool. The UNLA (the Uganda National Liberation Army) was really very small. It consisted of a remnant of 1,000 Ugandan troops, which had come out with Obote and had been trained in Sudan, not in Tanzania. There they were and they had given up. They were really settlers under the High Commission for Refugees. Their number had shrunk so that by the time we took Masaka, I think they were about 500 and they fought alongside our people until Amin was removed.

I said to Lule: "You go and join them." He had his own clique. I said: "Lule, in a situation like this, do not join a clique if you really want to help unity. Go there and see, you might help to unite some of those people." Eventually we won, and the man was declared President and we recognised his government immediately.

The first thing he wants is to disarm the UNLA. I said: "Lule, you can go ahead and disarm them. I cannot disarm them for you. My troops and these people have been working together, it is a small group, why should I disarm them? What you need to do is to build a national army and we will help you to build a national army. Forget the 500, it is a small group; do not ask me to ask my army to disarm them. If they say, no, I cannot begin shooting the people."

Lule decided he was going to disarm them. So they got rid of him. That was what happened — and then he turns and blames me for not preventing his fall. I said: "How can I?" He says: "I am head of State without an army." I said: "But our army was there to help you, this was the purpose of that army — to help you, but do not ask it to fight your people. Do not ask my army to fight your people."

The fellow becomes President out of the blue, becomes President of a country and I give him advice. I say: "Look, Lule, nobody can run Uganda without Baganda, but do not pretend you are going to run the rest of Uganda, simply depending on the Baganda."

His first idea was to run the country with the Baganda. I said: "I won't help you in that, I am not engaged in running a tribal

government. You look at my government, you look at the army — it is not a tribal army, it is not a tribal government. I will help you to get out of very great difficulty, to have a national army. I will help you recruit. Nobody can run your country without the Baganda participating, but do not believe that you can run your country through the Baganda alone, you will run into trouble." Persistently, during those first weeks, I was telling him this. He was already beginning to think in terms of returning the Kabaka. The fellow was a blessed fool. So he went.

Binaisa they picked themselves; I do not know where they got him from. Binaisa was not foolish, but they were all looters of their own country. Within those four months I think Lule had become a millionaire and this other fellow also within a short period, he became a millionaire. They loot their own country and then they say I masterminded the removal of these looters. My army was not there to protect looters. I never helped to overthrow them, but I told them that if they ran against their own people my army would not protect them.

☐ There is a previous President of the Seychelles, James Mancham. I do not know if you have read his book *"Paradise Raped."* In it he personally accuses you of direct intervention in the affairs of the Seychelles and he says that Tanzania trained René's people for armed insurrection. It has also been said that at one time you advocated the regrouping of the former German colonies in this area into a federation and that, in fact, you were actively helping the Burundis towards this end.

You know, I am going to end up the biggest African imperialist! There was a series of articles by Binaisa on how I am building my empire. I suppose this accusation arose because at about the same time we had troops in Uganda; in Mozambique (because of the Zimbabwe war); then we had troops in Comoros before the coup by the mercenaries, and troops in Seychelles. This was Tanzania building its empire! What these people are really saying is that if they were in Tanzania's position they would be building an empire.

Mancham? I don't know. He had a reputation for being a playboy. One thing is true about the Seychelles: it was the only coup which we knew about in advance. It was during the Commonwealth summit, and someone had whispered: "A coup is going to take place in the Seychelles when these people are in London." It did take place. Another thing which is true, René and his people immediately sent us a message asking us to recognise them. We did not. We thought: "Boy, if we recognise them, they will really think we are linked

with them, because we have this peculiar reputation." The British Government sent me a message asking whether I was going to recognise the government of Seychelles. I said: "I am waiting for you people, to see whether you are going to recognise them."

The first two governments to recognise that government were the British and the Americans. After that I said I, too, would recognise it. These are the facts. Time elapsed before they asked us to loan them a company of troops. We sent them the company of troops.

About the Comoros which is another country where I am supposed to have wanted to build my empire, if they only knew the truth, they would be surprised what our troops were being asked to do. Those people were virtually asking us to run the country. We said: "No, this is not what we are here for."

This reputation, I believe, is part of the anti-Tanzania propaganda. This nonsense that Tanzania is becoming big-headed and trying to become a super-power. This poor country? You know, some republics are called banana republics; my republic here is a cashew-nut republic. A cashew-nut republic trying to become a super-power? I would have to be one of the biggest fools in Africa to have these pretences.

The Mozambicans were fighting; I have troops there, but South Africa's claim that I have several battalions there is a damn lie. Samora (Machel) has a problem and he says: "Mwalimu, can't you even help us with training?" Am I supposed to say no?

We are all poor, helping one another, I am nothing here. During the armed struggle, until the independence of Zimbabwe, during the whole of that period in Southern Africa, my poor country here was quietly spending the equivalent of \$3m a year. Why? Because I did believe that until they became free we were not free. Now, we have people in Mozambique, but they are not fighting. I have a camp there where we are helping with training, not because I want to build an empire, but because we are freedom fighters.

☐ How do you see the racial confrontation in Southern Africa finally coming to a conclusion?

The situation being what it is, I think it is going to be very bloody. How bloody I do not know, but it will be very bloody. Change in South Africa will have to be by force because there is no philosophy of change there. Those people are not prepared to share power; they are against the sharing of power as a religion. For this they quote the Bible. The people there will have to keep on struggling, causing trouble. The rest of the world will have to apply a lot of pressure. These struggles will include different kinds of violence to bring about change. Change will not come voluntarily. How much bloodshed there is going to be really depends on the degree of resistance to change.

But if a miracle took place and the South Africans crossed the Rubicon of racial discrimination and it became simply a matter of political prudence . . . if, for example, they were to say: "Look, here we are a minority, we have run this country for a long time. Okay, we accept change, we accept that we must share power with the Africans, but how quickly, how soon? One-man-one-vote at this precise moment is going to run us into a mess. Couldn't this come gradually?" Then, once they cross that Rubicon, there is a possibility of change with a minimum of violence, because there will be many people in South Africa who are going to say: "Well, that's fine, so who should have the vote? Those with so much education?"

Every time I explain this, I remind people that Tanganyika became independent before we had universal suffrage. The vote that brought independence was not one-man-one-vote, it was a limited one. The British refused to accept one-man-one-vote. So, if a miracle happens — and it has to be a miracle because these people are against the African philosophically — and the South Africans said they are willing to share power with all the citizens of South Africa but left the question of its timing to discussion, then the desperation might be removed from the situation.

☐ Do you see how African states can break the stranglehold of the foreign exchange dead-end that we are in today? It seems time that some radical initiative is needed, but looking at all the experiments going on, we all seem to be doing the same thing.

Our problem is that we are very import-dependent. A certain amount of import-dependence is necessary for young countries trying to develop in the 20th century. But obviously it has to be at acceptable limits. Then you must ask yourself what kind of society you want to build. You see what the British have built, what the Americans have built, what the Germans have built and, if that is the kind of society you want to build, then the import dependence becomes permanent. There is no way you can break it. You can break it by defining the kind of country you want and then change the selective imports which will help you to build your base. If a sufficient number of African countries were to make this decision then we can make it. But the temptations from the developed countries are too great, they are preventing us from building this base, because they say you can import. Yes, we can import, but what do we want to import? What do I want from the outside world? Do I want bicycles or do I want Mercedes-Benz cars? Import to remain dependent, or import to reduce dependence? That selection has got to be made, and it is very difficult for single countries to make

☐ The office of Head of State is a lonely one. Do you not find that after so many years your friends are now from your official family and that you lose touch with people who are not necessarily in that official family who may well tell you: "Look, this is what the people are really thinking"?

It is partly true, being Head of State has its problems. Had I not been Head of State, I suppose I would not have that wall or that fence you see over there. You would not have people there asking everybody: "Who are you? Where are you going?" Even members of my own family are asked.

Just before your arrival I had an old woman sitting here. She is a widow of some old man who was a very strong member of the party. Sometimes she is turned back and when I find out I get worked up. It can be extremely irritating, but this is a fact of life. These positions have their own realities and however much you try to shake them, the core still remains. So in that sense, every Head of State becomes a bit isolated, and has a slightly artificial life.

If one is in this position for a long time, as I have been, then in a sense one begins to accept that limitation as reality. But one can still be open, to a degree. One can have a Head of State who is completely surrounded by officials; he has no other contact and this can be very dangerous. He is out of touch with reality, inevitably, and what he is told sometimes is what people want to give him. They feed him like Peking duck.

In our own case, we have a very large party and very often we meet all sorts of people. You know what is happening. And then I travel a great deal, I go out to my own village and when I am there my Presidential hat is not particularly respected there, thank God! So I become, within those limits, a member of the family. It is truly being at home. In my own village people ask me openly: "Where are you going?" So that modifies the situation a little bit and I believe I have reasonably kept touch with the people over the last 25 years. I think I know what is going on. And therefore I hope I have remained reasonably human.

☐ How do you visualise Tanzania in the year 2000?

Reasonably comfortable, reasonably Socialist ●

GOVERNMENT PLANNING TO REVIVE SMALL-SCALE MINING

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[Text]

Small-scale mining has been neglected in Tanzania for many years, but the government is now planning to revive this sector. In recent years small miners have been banned from exploiting minerals, mainly gold and tin, and this has meant the loss of nearly half of the sector's contribution to the national product.

The state loses millions of shillings each year from black marketeering of gold. Small-scale miners normally sell a majority of their output to Asian goldsmiths in towns like Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Dodoma, Tabora and Kigoma. They record a token amount for government officials to see on paper.

One former small-scale gold miner admitted recently: "When I used to dig gold, we did get plenty of it, sometimes even up to 10 kgs. We would sell at least 6 kgs of this and record 4 kgs for eagle-eyed officials."

He added: "For us Asians, gold is a lucrative market. This is the second form of currency to take abroad. The Tanzanian shilling is valueless abroad, and so if one smuggles out generous quantities of gold, there is no need to pine for remaining bank balances in Tanzania."

He also disclosed that a lot of gold mined by the small-scale miners finds its way to Nairobi and Mombasa, in neighbouring Kenya.

"In the days when the Namanga border used to be open, I used to take kilogrammes, literally, kilogrammes of gold, concealed in my Land Rover. From there, after selling the gold at inflated prices, I used to remit money into my overseas bank account. It was as easy as that. These days, with the borders sealed, still Asian goldsmiths find their way into neighbouring countries to sell gold. All this because Asians buy gold ornaments in bulk and store them away for the rainy day."

Sources in Dar es Salaam estimated that Tanzania loses more than Tshs20m each year in the illicit trade in gold, not including

the amount of gold that is illegally hoarded by goldsmiths in various Tanzanian towns.

The Ministry of Minerals' plan, therefore, is not only to boost the production of minerals under the small-scale sector but also to combat the illegal trade in gold.

Under the Mining Ordinance, repealed in 1979, any Tanzanian resident over the age of 17 could acquire a lease for prospecting, mining or reconnaissance of minerals. Out of the nearly 1,500 mining sites available, more than 450 have been leased to mineral prospectors. Besides these leaseholders, about 10,000 people are engaged in mining in Tanzania.

One problem in the past has been the indiscriminate issue of leases. The government lacked effective machinery to collect minerals from the leaseholders, leading to a rise in illegal mining and lucrative racketeering.

Illegal miners also left a trail of environmental destruction, including trails of trenches and gullies, after digging out gold. The illegal mining also caught on with young farmers who abandoned their agricultural work in the villages and joined the gold rush. This led to fights and even murder over mining rights.

The government was forced to clamp down on small-scale mining because of these problems. This time the authorities are planning to go systematically and solve the immediate problems facing the young miners.

Paul Bomani, Tanzania's Minister for Minerals, said that the government would begin by training prospective miners through a series of seminars. This would enable the beginners to understand the basics of mining and also follow up the best techniques of extracting minerals from the rocks and to show them how to handle dynamite.

The Ministry is also planning to spend thousands of shillings setting up six centres in Tanzania where tools used for mining can be bought, loans processed and minerals bought. These are expected to be

established in Morogoro, Karagwe, Mpanda, Chunya, Tarime and Geita, the principal centres for gold and tin mining.

Banks will provide financial backing to buy equipment and tools. For their daily requirements, individual miners will be provided with overdraft facilities. Ministry officials will be posted in various parts of the country to help prepare feasibility studies for mining operations and also recommend which applications need financial backing.

Applications for loans for infrastructure will be submitted to the Tanzania Housing Bank. Those applicants requiring loans for machinery and tools should go to the National Bank of Commerce. The government is planning to spend Tshs10m to import some of the main mining tools and either re-sell or hire them to small miners directly or on loan basis.

Elaborate arrangements are also being made to check the illegal miners. Bomani said that his Ministry would appraise the marketing arrangements in the regions where they are obtained in large quantities.

But one thing that could almost eliminate the illicit trade in gold is the question of payments to the miners. Bomani said that the government would regularly review the prices of minerals.

With the new initiatives being launched, special arrangements are at hand to re-open small-scale gold mines to Mbeva, Mwanza, Shinyanga, Mara and Rukwa regions.

Under the new system, the government will register afresh all prospective gold mines. Non-citizen living in Tanzania will not be allowed to take part in small-scale mining activities.

Mobile marketing arrangements will be established to buy gold from the miners two or three times a week. This would also ensure the safety of gold diggers who have to travel long distances to sell the mineral. In the past, small-scale miners have been ambushed by thugs and their gold stolen. Special Land Rovers will be used to

facilitate gold-buying and to confirm on the spot deals.

The State Mining Corporation (Stamico) is now lining up teams of people who would buy the gold at the six centres. Seminars on zonal and national levels have already been conducted to prepare mining experts.

Bomani said that small-scale tin miners can market the metal after it has been processed at a mobile tin processing plant which has already been stationed at Kverwa in Kagera Region. Tin ore miners would have to pay a small fee to process the metal.

The Ministry of Minerals would make regular checks to ensure that the miners conducted their activities legally and see if the loans are being utilised for the purpose for which they were given.

Critics feel that the operations of small-scale miners might hamper any efforts by large mines to exploit further reserves of minerals. At present in Tanzania there are large-scale mining operations like the Williamson Diamonds Mine, Mwadui, in Shinyanga Region, contributing 90% of foreign exchange earnings from mining. Buckreef Gold Mine, in Geita, Mwanza Region and the Minjingu Phosphates Mine, in Hanang, Arusha Region, also supply Tanzania's minerals. The country will also have plenty of coal when the large-scale mine at Songwe-Kiwira in Mbeya Region is completed.

"With small-scale mining, the government is planning to ensure that this group's activities accelerate the development of the mining sector rather than compete against the large-scale mines. Logically, there is no scope for competition between the large-scale mines and the small-scale diggers," explained a Ministry official.

Tanzanians may be able to overcome immediate problems over technology for small-scale miners, but it remains to be seen how effectively the scourge of racketeering and smuggling of gold out of Tanzania will be eliminated. ●

UPPER VOLTA

COMMUNIQUE ON VIGILANCE AGAINST DISHONEST PEOPLE

AB262150 Ouagadougou Domestic Service in French 2000 GMT 26 Dec 83

[Communique issued by Seydou Traore, Upper Voltan rural development minister, in Ouagadougou on 26 December]

[Text] The National Council of the Revolution [CNR], moved by its sense of responsibility, has taken steps aimed at solving the problems caused by the drought in Upper Volta, particularly in the provinces of Sahel, Soum, and Yatenga. This shows clearly that it is firmly determined, and constantly eager to safeguard the real interests of the people.

This desire to check the aftermath of the drought was materialized through the creation of revolutionary solidarity funds inspiring the revolutionary feeling of all Upper Voltan people. Steps were taken to dispatch emergency food supplies to the hardest hit zones. But then, dishonest and unscrupulous individuals still in the ranks of Upper Volta's revolutionary people, especially in Sahel Province, are taking advantage of the sad situation by diverting the food from its rightful beneficiaries and thus negating the efforts of the Upper Voltan people.

In view of this the CNR appeals for vigilance on the part of revolutionary defense committees, high commissioners [senior administrative officers heading the provinces], prefects, and law-enforcement agencies in the affected provinces to bar the way to these sad individuals who are only motivated by their selfish interests, and to protect the achievements of the people who should not be allowed to fall victim to dishonesty. The Fatherland or death, we shall overcome.

CSO: 3419/267

COMMENTARY ON NEW REASONS FOR HOPE IN ECONOMIC FIELD

AB201050 Kinshasa AZAP in French 0900 GMT 20 Dec 83

[AZAP commentary: "A Discovery Rich in Promises"]

[Text] Kinshasa, 20 Dec (AZAP)--All the activities now being undertaken inside and outside the national territory by the promoters of Zaire's development help to ensure for the nation continued progress and new reasons for hope.

The very recent discovery of a new oil deposit off the Zairian coast by the Zaire-Gulf Oil Company acting on behalf of the "Gulf-Teikoku Cometra" consortium opens for our country's economy new prospects which enable us to envisage the future with a little more optimism.

In fact, this discovery gives the national economy being shaken by the world economic crisis more strength to enable it to resist better the ruthless bad temper of the recession now paralyzing the economies of the world. Zaire--a wealthy country with immense natural resources and constantly increasing human potentials--cannot present itself on the financial market like an unworthy beggar because, as Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko once said, "anyone who helps Zaire also helps himself."

It is in this perspective that one should consider the contract now binding the country to the IMF, the inevitable supplier of the funds needed for the development of our rich potentials. In this connection, the Zairian-Italian Refinery Company (SOZIR), which refines Zaire's share of the oil, is now negotiating with the World Bank a \$40 million loan that will enable the company to adapt its equipment to the quality of the crude oil produced by the Zaire-Gulf Oil Company and establish a bitumen production plant in Bas-Zaire.

The new discovery, therefore, falls within the context of Zaire's integrated investment policy which does not neglect any sector of the national life. It demonstrates the very strong determination of the second republic to free the country from its economic difficulties at all costs. In fact, increased oil production added to the refining of the Zairian crude oil by SOZIR will give the country more capacity to invest in productive sectors like agriculture and transport infrastructures. In fact, the economy of foreign exchange to be made thanks to the use of oil produced and refined locally will furnish Zaire with the indispensable means to relaunch its economy.

It will not be vain to hope that in the near future, Zaire--whose main source of revenues is mining--will figure prominently among the oil-producing and exporting countries south of the Sahara. According to this logic, the national economy would quickly recover from its malaise, remove the backwardness accumulated because of the world economic crisis, and give the Zairian people new reasons to hope and aspire for a bright future.

CSO: 3400/249

MINE EFFLUENTS POLLUTE THREE MAJOR RIVERS

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 2 Dec 83 p 12

[Text]

THREE major rivers in the mineral-rich Copperbelt province in Zambia are heavily polluted by mine effluents.

Research findings released in Lusaka show that water in the Kafue, Mwambashi and Chambishi rivers has been so polluted by copper and cobalt wastes that it is killing livestock.

The work carried out by the National Council for Scientific Research (NCSR), a local research institution, shows that the level of the two minerals in water from the rivers was dangerously high.

The findings revealed that the copper content in water from the Kafue river was 90 times more than normal, while that from Mwambashi was 120 times and that from Chambishi was 23 times more than the accepted level.

Farmers along the affected rivers have been warned against allowing their animals to drink water and graze near the rivers as they risked death from chronic copper and cobalt poisoning.

The research was initiated after several animals had died on farms along the polluted rivers.

When the Dept of Vet Services failed to explain the deaths an

expert from the research council was invited to work with officers from the department.

Water, grass and mud samples from the rivers were taken to NCSR laboratories in Lusaka for analysis and the results have just been released.

The research findings show that animals such as cattle, sheep and goats did not die immediately after drinking the water but do so several months after the two minerals had accumulated in their bodies.

The animals suffered from diarrhoea, loss of weight, indigestion, the gall bladder became extended, the liver turned yellow or orange and lost their appetite leading to a slow death.

"We have advised farmers to dig boreholes and fence off their farms to stop cattle straying to the rivers," a spokesman for the Veterinary department said.

In September this year, High Court bailiffs seized 20 vehicles belonging to the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) for failure to pay more than K220,000 in damages to six farmers whose animals died as a result of drinking polluted water from the rivers.

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